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In recent years there have been an increasing number and variety
of cases before the National Labor Relations Board dealing with
objections to elections conducted in accordance with the National
Labor Relations Act. Although not all labor elections are objected to,
the scope of the problem becomes apparent when we consider the fact
that during the last calendar year, the total number of all types of
elections conducted by the Board has been placed at 7,300, which
represents an increase of approximately 2,500 over the calendar year
1958. 1
This observation was made by Frank W. McCulloch, Chairman
of the NLRB, speaking at the August 1962 meeting of the American
Bar Association in San Francisco. Discussing the limitations to be
placed on pre-election speech and propaganda, he addressed himself
to the question whether the introduction of new and more sophisticated
techniques of communication and a more sophisticated labor force
require modification of the NLRB rules, in view of the expansive
nature of the problem. The purpose of this article, then, is to present
a backdrop for this inquiry, spotlighting the campaign techniques of
both labor and management prior to the Regional Director's holding
of an election.
II. BACKGROUND
The National Labor Relations Board is empowered by virtue of
Section 9(c) and (e) of the National Labor Relations Act,2 upon the
* A.B., Rollins College; LL.B. 1938, Boston College; Ass't. Regional Attorney, NLRB,
Boston; Instructor, Boston College Law School. This article does not reflect the
official position of the Board.
1 Annual Report of the NLRB (1958).
2 49 Stat. 449 (1935) as amended by 61 Stat. 136 (1947) and 73 Stat. 519 (1959),
29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq. (1962).
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filing of a petition by either employer, employee or union, to conduct
secret ballot elections. The purpose is to determine the. desires of
employees as to union representation. Each type of election is specif-
ically designated by the Board,' and the period of time during which
it will review alleged objectional conduct is governed by the rules and
regulations of the NLRB. Until recently, such conduct was reviewable
only from the date the Regional Director or the Board issued a
"direction of election" up to and including the date of the election. 4
Now, from the time the election petition is filed in both contested' and
uncontested' elections, until the election itself is held, the Board will
consider the conduct of the parties to determine whether the voters
have exercised their free choice.
Within five days after the tally of the election ballots have been
furnished to the parties by the Regional Director, any party may file
objections. These are limited to the manner in which the election was
conducted by the NLRB and/or to conduct which affected the results
of the election, 7
 the latter forming the majority of such cases. Once
filed, an investigation is begun.' In an "agreement for consent elec-
tions,"9
 the Regional Director rules on the objections and issues a
decision from which there is no right of review." In a stipulated
election," the parties agree to waive their rights to any hearing before
3
 The designations are as follows:
RC A petition by a labor organization or employees for certification of repre-
sentatives for purposes of collective bargaining under § 9(c)(1) (a)(1).
RM A petition by employer for certification of a representative for the purposes
of collective bargaining under § 9(c) (1) (B).
RD A petition by employees under § 9(c) (1) (A) (ii) asserting that the union
previously certified or currently recognized by their employer as the
bargaining representative, no longer represents a majority of the em-
ployees in the appropriate unit.
UD A petition by employees under § 9(e)(1) asking for a referendum to
rescind a bargaining agent's authority to make a union shop contract under
§ 8(a)(3).
X	 The national emergency election, to determine whether employees wish to
accept the final offer of settlement made by their employer. This election
must be conducted between the sixtieth and seventy-fifth days after a
federal district court has issued an injunction against acts which imperil
or threaten to imperil the national safety.
4 In a contested election see F. W. Woolworth, 109 N.L.R.B. 1446, 34 L.R.R.M.
1584 (1954) and an uncontested or stipulated election see Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 101
N.L.R.B. 1118, 31 L.R.R.M. 1189 (1952).
6 Ideal Elec. & Mfg. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 1275, 49 L.R.R.M. 1316 (1961).
6 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 138 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 51 L.R.R.M. 1070 (1962).
7 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(a) (Supp. 1962) (Rules & Regs. of NLRB Series 8).
8 Id. § 102.69(c).
9 Id. § 102.62(a).
10 See Sumner Sand & Gravel Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 1368, 46 L.R.R.M. 1467 (1960),
also Elm City Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 228 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1955). For a con-
trary view, see NLRB v. Sidran, 181 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1950).




the election (in the consent election agreement, the parties waive any
possible hearing). The parties further agree that the Board in Wash-
ington, D. C. shall finally determine all questions relating to the elec-
tion, e.g., validity of challenges and election conduct objections, etc.
The Director prepares a report on any objections, with his recom-
mendations which he serves on the parties who may file exceptions
thereto within ten days to the Board.' On the other hand, where no
agreement for an election by consent has been reached," the Director
may either prepare a report on the objections, or rule on the objec-
tions, issuing a decision under the authority delegated to him by the
Board." If a report is filed, any party may file exception within ten
days. The Board considers whether substantial and material issues
with respect to the conduct or results of the election have been raised
and then either decides the matter on the record or directs that a hear-
ing be held." Alternatively, if the Regional Director has made a deci-
sion, the right of review by the Board is limited under the regulations
to those cases in which a substantial question of law or policy has been
raised."
The conduct by unions, employers or others which interferes with
the employees' free choice may or may not be of sufficient degree to
constitute an unfair labor practice. But because these activities are
considered in a different context, the same criteria does not apply.
If an unfair labor practice charge is filed against an employer, ordi-
narily an election will not be conducted pending its disposition, 17
whereas if a charge is filed after the election, the Board will usually
consolidate it with the objections to the election and hear both matters
at the same time."
Objectionable conduct may be effected by words or deeds or both.
However, such conduct as changing fringe benefits, interrogation, in-
timidation and surveillance of employees, wage increases or decreases
by the employer, threats or other coercion on the part of unions, while
certainly relevant, shall not be considered since this article is confined
to the use of campaign propaganda and activities in NLRB elections.
Nevertheless, in order to properly evaluate a particular case, it is
necessary to consider all the activities or conduct involved, including
speeches, literature, and the like.
12 Id. § 102.69(c).
13 Id. § 102.63 et seq.
14 Id. § 102.69(c).
15 Id. § 102.69(c) & (d).
16 Id. § 102.67.
17 Franz Food Prods., 137 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 50 L.R.R.M. 1143 (1962),
18 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.69(e) & 102.46 (Supp. 1962).
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III. PROCESS OF BOARD DETERMINATION
A. Ground Rules
As the cases have been decided by the NLRB, certain ground
rules have been developed which are used by the Board in deciding
these cases on an ad hoc basis. Consider, for example, the General
Shoe Corp. case,Ja decided in 1948. It is perhaps the leading case
dealing with campaign propaganda and is significant, among other
things, in that the Board characterizes its responsibilities by stating:
[W]e cannot police the details surrounding every election,
and because we believe that in the absence of excessive acts
employees can be taken to have expressed their true convic-
tions in the secrecy of the polling booth, the Board has
exercised this power sparingly. . . . In election proceedings,
it is the Board's function to provide a laboratory in which
an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly
ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the
employees. . . 20
This, because it has been thought better to leave "to the good sense
of the voters the appraisal of such matters, and to opposing parties
the task of correcting inaccurate and untruthful statements." 2'
This rule was later refined in the Radio Corp. of America case
where the Board stated:
. . . in the absence of coercion, it will not undertake to
censor or police union campaigns or to consider the truth
or falsity of electioneering propaganda, unless the ability of
the employees to evaluate such material has been so impaired
by the campaign material or by campaign trickery that the
uncoerced desires of the employees cannot be determined. 22
A 1961 pronouncement by the Board found in the United States
Gypsum Co. case summarized its position:
The general rules which the Board applies to election
campaigns are well settled and not in dispute. Exaggerations,
inaccuracies, partial truths, name calling, and falsehoods,
while not condoned, may be excused as legitimate campaign
propaganda provided they-are not so misleading as to prevent
the exercise of a free choice by employees in the election of
their bargaining representative. Absent threats or other ele-
19 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1948).
20 Id. at 126-27, 21 L.R.R.M. at 1340-41.
21 Stewart Warner Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1158, 31 L.R.R.M. 1397, 1399 (1953).
22 106 N.L.R.B. 1393, 1394, 33 L.R.R.M. 1035 (1953).
23 130 N.L.R.B. 901, 47 L.R.R.M. 1436 (1961).
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ments of intimidation, the Board will not undertake to police
or censor the propaganda material used by the participants
in a Board election, and leaves it to the . . . employees them-
selves to evaluate . . . such utterances. However, when one
of the parties deliberately misstates material facts which are
within its special knowledge, under such circumstances that
the other party or parties cannot learn about them in time to
point out the misstatements, and the employees themselves
lack the independent knowledge to make possible a proper
evaluation of the misstatements, the Board will find that the
bounds of legitimate campaign propaganda have been ex-
ceeded and will set aside an election. 24
Notwithstanding the above, the Board has recognized the efforts
of a party to rectify any improper campaign technique, evidence of
this being clearly seen from the language of one of the earlier cases
in the area:
We believe that the statements . . . made by the Petitioner
before the election were not such as would under the cir-
cumstances improperly interfere with the employees' exercise
of a free choice of a bargaining representative at the polls.
Moreover, any coercive element which may have been con-
tained in some of the statements was effectively dissipated
by speeches of the Employer's president on July 6 and 20. 2E
Another significant ground rule case is the recent Hollywood
Ceramics Co. decision.2° In overruling a line of cases which suggested
that the misrepresentation must be deliberate in order to set aside an
election, the Board stated:
We believe that an election should be set aside only
where there has been a misrepresentation or other similar
campaign trickery, which involves a substantial departure
from the truth, at a time which prevents the other party or
parties from making an effective reply, so that the misrepre-
sentation whether deliberate or not, may reasonably be
expected to have a significant impact on the election 2r
The Board noted, however, that statements which may be reasonably
construed to contain a threat of reprisal or force or a promise of
24
 Id. at 904 and citing Cleveland Trencher Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 600, 47 L.R.R.M. 1371
(1961) ; Kawneer Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1460, 41 L.R.R.M. 1333 (1958) ; Thomas Gouzoule
d/b/a/ The Calidyne Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1028, 39 L.R.R.M. 1364 (1957).
25
 Bender Playground Equip., Inc., 97 N.L.R.B. 1561, 1562, 29 L.R.R.M. 1284, 1285
(1951).
26 140 N.L.R.B. No. 36, 51 L.R.R.M. 1600 (1962).
27 51 L.R.R.M. at 1601. Cf. Lane Drug Stores, Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 584, 25 L.R.R.M.
1360 (1950).
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benefit will invalidate an election and it is not a defense that the
message was equivocally phrased."
B. Judicial Review
Board determinations in a representation proceeding are not re-
viewable by district courts under their general equity jurisdiction."
Review is granted, with several exceptions, only when relevant to an
unfair labor practice proceeding in a circuit court of appeals. This is
due to the fact that Congress rejected, both in 1935 (Wagner Act)
and 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), proposals for a direct review of repre-
sentation determinations because it believed that the opportunity for
such review would result in the employment of dilatory tactics. This
in turn would frustrate the statute's basic policy of promoting col-
lective bargaining.
The provisions of the act, however, expressly provide the em-
ployer with an additional statutory procedure for obtaining review of
Board representation determinations in an appropriate court of ap-
peals. If an employer is aggrieved by the determination of the Board
in a representation case, he may refuse to bargain with the union
certified. Upon the filing of a charge and the issuance of a complaint,
a finding by the Board that the employer committed a violation of
section 8(a) (5), (refusing to bargain with the union) is reviewable
directly under section 8(e) and (f) of the act in a United States Court
of Appeals. This may be either upon petition by the Board to enforce
its order or on the petition of "any person aggrieved." Section 9(d)
provides that in such a situation, the record in the representation case
shall be filed in the court of appeals, and the representation deter-
mination may be reviewed at that time.
Two narrow exceptions to the general rule of nonreviewability
of representation determinations have been recognized in actions in-
stituted by unions, as distinguished from employers, in district courts
since no similar statutory review procedure is available to them. In
such cases, review authority exists only where it can be shown that
the Board's action constitutes either a violation of an express statu-
tory command" or raises a substantial constitutional question."
At this point, the particular devices and techniques used by em-
ployers and unions should be examined to see how the NLRB has
28 Citing Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. No. 189, 51 L.R.R.M. 2608 (1962).
29 AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1939); McLeod v. Local 476, 288 F.2d 198 (2d
Cir. 1961) ; Carpenters v. Vincent, 286 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1960) ; Leedom v. I.B.E.W.,
278 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1960); National Biscuit Div. v. Leedom, 265 F.2d 101 (D.C.
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1011 (1959) ; Fitzgerald v. Douds, 167 F.2d 714 (2d
Cir. 1948).
28 Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1959), affirming, 249 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
Si Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1949).
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dealt with them. It is essential to observe that the Board considers
each case on its own facts and that the foregoing ground rules do not
necessarily apply to every case.
IV. OBJECTIONS TO CONDUCT OF EMPLOYERS
A. Limitations on Speeches and Written Communications
Unquestionably the largest area of objections to elections con-
cerns speeches and letters or pamphlets distributed prior to the elec-
tion. The employer who is faced with an election has two limitations
on what he can say or write to his employees.
The first is the so-called twenty-four (24) hour rule which pre-
cludes an employer from making a pre-election speech to massed
assemblies of his employees within twenty-four hours of the holding
of the election if the speech is to be made on company time and
attendance is compulsory. It is also referred to as the Peerless Plywood
rule as it evolved from the Board's reasoning in the Peerless case:
It is our considered view, based on experience with conduct-
ing representation elections, that last-minute speeches by
either employers or unions delivered to massed assemblies of
employees on company time have an unwholesome and un-
settling effect and tend to interfere with that sober and
thoughtful choice which a free election is designed to reflect.
We believe that the real vice is in the last-minute character
of the speech coupled with the fact that it is made on com-
pany time whether delivered by the employer or the union or
both. Such a speech, because of its timing, tends to create a
mass psychology which overrides arguments made through
other campaign media and gives an unfair advantage to the
party, whether employer or union, who in this manner ob-
tains the last most telling word."
The Board, fearful of an unwarranted extension, clearly stressed that
this prohibition does not apply to the distribution of literature, nor
does it apply when employee attendance is voluntary and on the
employees' own time, nor will it prohibit an employer's speech on
company time beyond the twenty-four hour limitation even though
the union is not granted an opportunity to reply." A speech to seven
32 Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429, 33 L.R.R.M. 1151, 1152 (1953).
See also Rainfair Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. No. 187, 44 L.R.R.M. 1163 (1959) ; Sportswood
Specialty Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1094, 33 L.R.R.M. 1319 (1954).
33 Id. at 430, 33 L.R.R.M. at 1152. It should be noted that this reasoning was
applied in the Livingston Shirt case, 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 33 L.R.R.M. 1156 (1953), which
overruled the Bonwit Teller doctrine, 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 28 L.R.R.M. 1547 (1951), as to
both representation cases and unfair labor practice cases, in that, in the absence of
either a privileged or an unlawful broad no-solicitation rule, an employer does not corn-
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employees has been held not to violate this rule where there were 220
voting and the talk was informal and non-partisan."
The second limitation facing an employer is not as easily or
clearly determined. Generally stated, it is that an employer may not
make any statements or speeches which are coercive in that they con-
tain threats of reprisal or force or promises of benefit. This limitation
involves an interpretation of Section 8(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended," the historical development of which is
necessary in order to fully understand its application.
During the period of 1935 to 1947, the National Labor Relations
Act, or Wagner Act as it was commonly called, did not have any "free
speech" provisions. The NLRB was guided by the strictures of the
first amendment to the Constitution." The Supreme Court in Thorn-
hill' v. Alabama," Thomas v. Collins, 38 and NLRB v. Virginia Elec.
& Power Co." supported the view that the first amendment protects
an employer's expressions of noncoercive opinion to his employees
respecting union organization.
In the leading case of Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB,"
the Supreme Court found an employer's statement coercive when
considered in a background of anti-union activities. This was called
the "totality of conduct" doctrine and was followed in the case of
Matter of Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. where the Board concluded:
The pamphlet on its face contains no coercive statements, but
consists essentially of statements disparaging unions and of
expressions of opinion as to the disadvantages of labor organ-
ization—statements which, standing alone, are protected by
the constitutional guarantee of free speech. Nor are the state-
ments coercive when evaluated in the context in which they
were made.'"
mit an unfair labor practice or engage in conduct which will overturn an election if he
makes a non-coercive speech to his employees and denies the union an opportunity to
reply on company premises.
For a more complete discussion concerning property rights in this area, see Hanley,
Union Organization on Company Property—A discussion of Property Rights, 47 Geo.
L.J. 206 (1958).
84 National Petro-Chems. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1610, 33 L.R.R.M. 1443 (1954).
85 73 Stat. 525 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. 158(c) (1962).
36 U.S. Const. amend. I.
81
 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
88 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
36 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
40 319 US. 533 (1941).
41 72 N.L.R.B. 132, 134 (19 L.R.R.M. 1145) (1947). See also Ray Dept. Stores
Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376 (1945) ; Donnelly & Sons Co. v. NLRB, 156 F.2d 416 (7th
Cir. 1946) ; NLRB v. Fairmount Creamery, 144 F.2d 128 (10th Cir. 1944); Stone &




These cases set the stage for the 1947 amendments to the Wagner
Act, i.e., the Labor Management Relations or Taft-Hartley Act.'
Questioning the constitutionality of the "totality of conduct" doctrine,
the majority House Report stated:
Although the old Labor Board protests it does not limit free
speech, it is apparent from decisions of the Board itself that
what persons say in the exercise of their right of free speech
has been used against them. The bill provides that the new
Board is prohibited from using as evidence against an em-
ployer, an employee, or a union, any statement that by its
own terms does not threaten force or economic reprisal."
The Minority House Report, in a far more pragmatic opinion,
took issue with the majority:
But these provisions [sec. 8(d) (1), now sec. 8(c), which
provide that it shall not constitute an unfair labor practice
to express any views, arguments or opinions in written,
printed or visual form if the expression by its own terms does
not threaten force or economic reprisal] go far beyond mere
protection of an admitted constitutional right. By saying that
statements are not to be considered as evidence, they insist
that the Board and the courts close their eyes to the plain
implication of speech and disregard clear and probative evi-
dence. In no field of the law are a man's statements excluded
as evidence of an illegal intention. Here, again, a deep seated
intention to protect employers in the commission of unfair
labor practices is evident. Here, again, the laudable purpose
of protecting free speech cloaks an evil design to encourage
unfair labor practices by employers."
The majority Senate Report on its version of the free speech
provision left unaltered the existing law by stating:
The committee believes these decisions" to be too restrictive,
and, in this section, [8(c)], provides that if, under all the
circumstances, there is neither an expressed or implied threat
of reprisal, force, or offer of benefit, the Board shall not
predicate any finding of unfair labor practice upon the state-
ment. The Board, of course, will not be precluded from con-
sidering such statements as evidence."
42 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq. (1962).
43 H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1947).
44 H.R. Minority Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 84-85 (1947).
45 Referring to Monumental Life Ins. Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 247, 18 L.R.R.M. 1206 (1946).
and Clark Bros., 70 N.L.R.B. 60, IS L.R.R.M. 1360 (1946).
40 S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1947).
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The Minority Senate Report's only comment was as follows:
We agree with the excellent protection of the right of free
speech accorded by section 8(c), and, except for the quali-
fications that we have noted with respect to the cooling off
provision, with the definition of collective bargaining con-
tained in section 8(d) [sic] .47
In section 8(c), as finally adopted, the part which recites "The
expressing of any views, arguments, or opinions, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any provi-
sions of this Act," is identical with section 8(d) (1) of H.R. 3020 as
reported, and the addition of the phrase "if such expression contains
no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit," is identical with
the last clause of section 8(c) of S. 1126 as reported. It should be
noted that the clause "if it does not by its own terms threaten force
or economic reprisal," which was contained in the House bill," was
deleted before final passage.
Thus, it appears that the NLRB, after passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act with its free speech provision, was faced with these issues:
1. Is a statement, oral or written, an unfair labor practice if it,
by its own terms, contains a threat of force or economic re-
prisal?
2. May a statement, though innocuous in itself, be used in con-
junction with reasonably simultaneous events to determine
the possibility of an unfair labor practice?
3. Does section 8(c) apply to representation cases or is it lim-
ited to only unfair labor practice cases?
The first issue is easily decided since by definition such a state-
ment is not protected by section 8 (c), and would be an unfair labor
practice unless it was an isolated or remote threat of force or economic
reprisal."
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered the
second issue in the 1949 case of NLRB v. Kropp Forge Co.," in-
volving enforcement of an order of the Board. After summarizing the
prior cases,' the court stated:
47
 S. Minority Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1947).
48 Supra note 43, at 26.
45 Safeway Stores, 122 N.L.R.B. 1369, 43 L.R.R.M. 1302 (1959) ; Frohman Mfg. Co.,
107 N.L.R.B. 1308, 33 L.R.R.M. 1338 (1954) ; Peerless Woolen Mills, 86 N.L.R.B. 82,
24 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1949) ; Madix Asphalt Roofing Corp., 85 N.L.R.B. 26, 24 L.R.R.M.
1342 (1949).
ISO 178 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1949).
51
 NLRB v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 175 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1949) ; NLRB v.
La Salle Shed Co., 178 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1949) ; NLRB v. Gate City Cotton Mills, 167
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Therefore, in determining whether such statements and ex-
pressions constitute, or are evidence of unfair labor practice,
they must be considered in connection with the positions of
the parties, with the background and circumstances under
which they are made, and with the general conduct of the
parties. If, when so considered, such statements form a part
of a general pattern or course of conduct which constitutes
coercion and deprives the employees of their free choice
guaranteed by Section 7, such statements must still be con-
sidered as a basis for a finding of unfair labor practice. To
hold otherwise would nullify the guarantee of employees'
freedom of action and choice which Section 7 of the Act ex-
pressly provides. Congress, in enacting Section 8(c) could
not have intended that result. 52
The Board's approach to the problem may be found in the rep-
resentative language of a 1952 case:
Under some circumstances expression of preference by
supervisors may be privileged under Section 8(c) of the Act,
as may be simple expressions of preference by an employer.
In the context of the whole case, including the Employer's
hasty recognition of the AFL on a card showing with rival
organizing going on, however, the activities of these super-
visors obviously reflect employer intent and action to aid one
of two competing labor organizations, which is not protected
by Section 8(c). 53
The applicability of section 8(c) to representation cases, the
third issue, has run the full gauntlet." The early Board cases indi-
cated that, section 8(c) notwithstanding, if the employees' free choice
was interfered with, the election would be set aside." Later cases held
that an employer's speech was protected by section 8(c) 55 although
F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1948); NLRB v. Ford, 170 F.2d 735 (fith Cir. 1948) ; Sax v. NLRB,
171 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1948),
52 Supra note 50, at 828-29.
5 a Corning Glass Works, 100 N.L.R.B. 444, 447, 30 L.R.R.M. 1307, 1308 (1952).
See also Cary Lumber Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 406, 31 L.R.R.M. 1324 (1953); Happ Bros.
Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1513, 26 L.R.R.M. 1356 (1950). Note in the Dal-Tex Optical Co. case,
supra note 28, the Board stated "Under all the circumstances" and cited NLRB v. Vir-
ginia Elec. & Power Co., supra note 39, which stands for the "totality" approach.
54 Note, Employer Free Speech in Union Organizing Campaigns, 15 U. Fla. L. Rev.
231 (1962).
55 General Shoe Corp., supra note 19; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 935,
26 L.R.R.M. 1294 (1950).
50 Lux Clock Mfg. Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 1194, 36 L.R.R.M. 1432 (1955); National
Furniture Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1300, 33 L.R.R.M. 1004 (1953); A. S. Abell Co.; 107
N.L.R.B. 362, 33 L.R.R.M. 1144 (1953); Esquire Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 1238, 33 L.R.R.M.
1367 (1953).
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these were specifically overruled in the recent case of Dal-Tex Optical
Co." The Board notes, however, that the strictures of the first amend-
ment, to be sure, must be considered in all cases." In view of this
fact, some courts have stated that section 8(c) is nothing more than
the first amendment restated."' Thus employers have urged that free
speech, whether protected by 8(c) or the Constitution, still controls
what an employer may state during an election campaign.
The problem was summarily treated by NLRB Member, Gerald
A. Brown. Speaking before the Labor Law Section of the State Bar
Association of Texas, he stated:
I would classify the principal problem presently before
the Board in balancing freedom of communication with free-
dom of employee choice as those involving: statements which
because they are couched in subtle or sophisticated language
can be construed as threats or promises of benefit or as mere
noncoercive attempts at employee persuasion; and misrepre-
sentations of facts, emotional appeals through the use of
movies, and appeals to racial prejudice to which the Board
either could apply truth therapy and find interference with
the laboratory conditions or relegate to the field of campaign
propaganda.6°
Considering this to be representative of the issues involved, the
following discussion will highlight the Board's determinations of these
issues.
B. Speeches and Written Communications in General
This area represents one of the most constant sources of conflict
and as a result, the Board has been called upon to hand down numer-
ous decisions. For present purposes, only the more significant cases
will be discussed. This will allow a general canvas of the area as well
as an exposition of the basic problems.
A very exemplary case occurred in 1954 where unfair labor
practices and objections to the election were consolidated.' The
Board found that the foreman had made the following statements:
that the "people would lose the plant"; that the stockholders would
be "left holding the bag"; that if the union lost, "everybody would
come back to work with a raise, and we would have better working
57 Supra note 28.
58 See text accompanying note 36 supra.
59
 NLRB v. Corning Glass Works, 204 F.2d 422 (1st Cir. 1953) ; NLRB v. Bailey
Co., 180 F.2d 278 (6th Cir. 1950) ; NLRB v. La Salle Steel Co., 178 F ,2d 829 (7th Cir,
1949).
eo 50 L.R.R.M. 72, 75 (1962),
01 Franchester Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 1391, 35 L.R.R.M. 1240 (1954) . See also NLRB
v. Frieder & Sons, 155 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1946).
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conditions" and that "the guys that stuck with the company would be
the guys to receive those [desirable] jobs." These, coupled with an
assurance of holiday pay to laid-off employees on the eve of the elec-
tion, were held by the Board to be actively calculated to interfere with
the employees' free choice. The election accordingly was set aside.
In a recent case" the Board concluded that the discharge of a
supervisor for his failure to join in the discriminatory discharge of
an employee had the effect of creating a reasonable fear in other
employees that the employer would take similar action against them
if they continued to support the union. This conduct was thus held
to inhibit a free and untrammeled electoral choice by the employees.
This same rationale was employed in an earlier case (which involved
other conduct as well). The employer stated that he would "meet any
union conditions" and granted a pay increase to one of the employees
because she was "with them, and deserved it." As a result, the election
was set aside.
A further example of employer-interference was brought out in
the Coca-Cola Bottling Co. case. The company president while ad-
dressing the employees stated:
I won't make you a lot of promises, but I can promise
you this. I can promise you a year round job with a year
round pay envelope, and you won't have to pay anybody to
get it, or to keep your job.
Your vote tomorrow is a vote for your future, but I am
also going to feel that every NO vote is not only a vote
against the union but is a vote for me. . . ."
The Board, holding this to be a promise of benefit which interfered
with the employees' free choice, directed a new election.
In other cases the Board held the premature distribution of pay
checks," the attempt to establish a grievance procedure controlled by
the company," and the granting of an additional holiday or overtime,
or a change in the vacation schedule," as sufficient interference to
warrant setting aside the elections.
In contrast to the above election-invalidating communications, the
Board has determined in other cases that the employer's statements
are privileged and not violative of the employees' free choice. In one
such case, a letter was sent to the employees a week before the election
stating: "Furthermore, in keeping with the company's progressive
62 General Eng'r, Inc., 131 N.L.R.B. 648, 48 L.R.R.M. 1105 (1961).
63 F. W. Woolworth Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1457, 31 L.R.R.M. 1238 (1952).
64 118 N,L.R.B. 1422, 1423, 40 L.R.R.M. 1390, 1391 (1957).
05 Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp., 82 N.L.R.B. 161, 23 L.R.R.M. 1529 (1949).
00 Precision Sheet Metal, 115 N.L.R.B. 949, 37 L.R.R.M. 1441 (1956).
eT Exchange Parts Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 806, 48 L.R.R.M. 1147 (1961).
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policy, since January, 1953, management has been working on a
formula to make possible the payment of average earnings, rather
than base rates for vacation and holidays." The Board, in reversing
the Regional Director, said that this statement fell short of a promise
of benefit contemplated by the Act." In a similar case," the employer,
three days before the election, held a foremen's meeting on company
time and property to which some employees were invited. They
attended without loss of pay and free beverages and dinner were
served. At the meeting the employer's president made a speech in
which he left no doubt that he opposed unionization. The Board
decided that such conduct per se was legitimate campaign media and,
without facts establishing that there were promises of benefits, threats
or reprisals, the election would stand.
A somewhat unusual situation arose in the Maine Fisheries Corp.
case." Here the Board set aside the first election because of the
employer's speech, but sustained the second election even though the
employer sent letters to the employees, a portion of which is as follows:
The Board said that he [the employer at the first election]
interfered with your freedom of choice. We disagree with
the National Labor Relations Board and we have told it so.
We never intended to bribe you for your vote. We respect
your honesty and good sense too much. Unfortunately, the
National Labor Relations Board does not understand the
practice in this industry of getting additional boats to bring
you fish to work on [referring to the employer's promise in
the first election]. So, here we are with another election.
This time with two unions trying to get your vote.71
The Board said that at most this statement was a reminder to the
employees of past benefits granted without union representation, and
sustained the result of the election wherein no collective bargaining
representative was chosen. This reasoning was determinative in a later
case similarly involving a letter sent to all employees. The Board held
that the letter merely urged the employees to consider their present
benefits in determining whether to vote for the union."
Other cases involving privileged or allowable campaign propa-
ganda concerned the Board with employer-statements that the em-
ployees would get their pay raise anyway" or that surveys and per-
sonnel studies would be postponed pending the election. 74 It was also
69
 American Laundry Mach. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 511, 33 L.R.R.M. 1181 (1953).
62 Zeller Corp., 115 N.L.R.B. 762, 37 L.R.R.M. 1399 (1956).
70 102 N.L.R.B. 108, 31 L.R.R.M. 1278 (1953).
71 Id. at 109-10, 31 L.R.R.M. at 1278.
72
 Tyler Pipe & Foundry Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1258, 38 L.R.R.M. 1455 (1956).
73
 Montgomery Ward & Co., 50 L.R.R.M. 1553 (1962).
74
 Group Hosp. Servs., 115 N.L.R.B. 1502, 38 L.R.R.M. 1098 (1956).
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concerned with such employer-conduct as increasing the value of
company outing tickets prior to the election" or stressing the employ-
er's economic condition."
C. Statements Pertaining to Employees' Legal Position
The value of previously decided employer-statement cases" as
precedence has been somewhat clouded by the recent decision in Marsh
Supermarkets, Inc.," at least to the extent that a careful examination
of language is required. In this case the company president and per-
sonnel director said at various meetings of employees that if the union
won the election, the employees would lose some benefits, particularly
a vacation plan, and would have to "start from scratch." This was
held to be a violation of section 8(a) (1) and the election was set aside.
In the decision, the Board refers to the Dal-Tex case," wherein an
atmosphere of fear of economic loss and hostility to the union was also
generated by the employer's statements. Thus, the language in Marsh
may be contrasted with strikingly similar language held by the Board
to be protected in the earlier La Pointe Mach. Tool Co." and Schick,
Inc.si cases. In the former the employer's vice-president stated:
The AFL will tell you that you are a separate unit and you
have the right to strike. If they are honest with you—and I
think they will be—they will tell you that the other em-
ployees of the Company probably will work while you strike
and, more than that, if the Company gets permanent replace-
ments to take your jobs while you are on strike, that you
have lost your jobs."
The latter involved the employer's foreman telling employees that the
Bluebook which contained employees' benefits would be "out" and
that the union would start bargaining "from scratch" if the union won.
In addition to Marsh, contrast Seltzer & Rydholm, Inc.," a more
recent case, not yet before the Board, in which the trial examiner
concluded in his intermediate report that the respondent-employer had
violated section 8(a) (1) of the act by threatening employees with
loss of benefits in the event they should favor the union. The case was
considered upon a stipulated set of facts derived solely from a series
76 American Thermos Prods., 119 N.L.R.B. 557, 41 L.R.R.M. 1134 (1957).
76 Meyer & Welch, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 706, 24 L.R.R.M. 1459 (1949).
77 Universal Producing Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 548, 43 L.R.R.M. 1480 (1959) ; Schick,
Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 1160, 40 L.R.R.M. 1330 (1957) ; LaPointe Mach. Tool Co., 113
N.L.R.B. 171, 36 L.R.R.M. 1273 (1955).
78 140 N.L.R,B, No. 83, 52 L.R.R.M. 1134 (1963).
79 Supra note 28.
80 Supra note 77, at 172, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1274.
8' Supra note 77.
82 Supra note 77, at 172, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1274.
83 1-C.A.-3948, Intermediate Report 102-63 (1963).
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of speeches to employees. The employer, while informing her employees
that she was not threatening them, stated:
We would not start from where we now are, we would wipe
the slate clean of all these benefits and fringes, and we're
going to start from scratch. We're going to start and bargain.
You probably would get some of the things back, I don't
know, I don't know how the union bargains. But we're not
going to start from where we now are, we're going to wipe the
slate clean, and start from scratch. They probably didn't tell
you that, but that's what we had to hire lawyers for. . . .
If the time ever comes, as I said before, we will do it in good
faith, but we would go entirely by the book, and strictly
from scratch. Everything will be wiped off and we will start
from scratch. Everything would be up for discussion."
D. Threats and/or Prediction
This is an area where the Board must determine whether, given
certain facts, a statement is a threat so as to void an election, or
merely a prediction, and hence privileged, so as not to disturb an
election. Once again, each case must be decided on its own particular
facts.
Voided elections have resulted from an employer stating that he
would refuse to bargain because the union was Communist dominated"
or a store manager's statement to an employee just before an election
that the employer would not sign a contract with the union," since
these were considered to be threats. In another case, a letter was sent
by the employer to his employees wherein he stated: "Your Company
would be happy to make these increases [$3 per week given to other
areas] available to you also, but we regret that in view of the pending
union representation proceeding in the National Labor Relations
Board, we are not permitted under the law to do so at this time or
until the legal objections are withdrawn."" The Board held that this
statement was not made in good faith and did interfere with the
employees' free choice.
A case where not only the employer's acts, but also those of the
local merchants and newspapers were involved, was the Falmouth Co.
case." Here the entire community participated in the rumor that the
plant would close if the union won. The Board, notwithstanding the
84 Ibid.
85
 Scavullo d/b/a/ Legion Utensils Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 875, 31 L.R.R.M. 1586 (1953).
86
 Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 329, 44 L.R.R.M. 1379 (1959).
87 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1118, 31 L.R.R.M. 1189, 1190 (1952).
88 114 N.L.R.B. 896, 37 L.R.R.M. 1057 (1955) ; See also Franchester Carp., 110




employer's last minute speech disaffirming such a plan, held that the
fear of economic loss which permeated the atmosphere surrounding
the election warranted its being set aside. Some other instances of
employer threats voiding an election are the threat to replace Negro
workers with white," the threat of loss of jobs" or bonus,' a possible
wage decrease," a loss of work and threat to move,° 3 an indication
that the union jeopardized defense contracts,° 4 a reference by an
employer to "Just look thirty miles down the road" where another
plant of the employer had closed," and a veiled threat to discharge the
employees and close the plant down."
Elements of misrepresentation, fear of economic loss and the con-
cept of the futility of unionization were grounds for setting aside elec-
tions in three recent Board cases. In Steel Equip. Co. the Board found
that the employer's statement in a leaflet received by the employees
one or two days before the scheduled election, contained a substantial
departure from the truth in stating that the quoted wage rates at
another plant were the products of collective bargaining by the peti-
tioning union. The Board, in setting aside the election, cited with
approval the Hollywood Ceramics case" and held that the assertions
of the employer were designed to implant in the minds of the em-
ployees a fear of economic and physical suffering, the probability of
loss of benefits and the hazards of collective bargaining."
In the leading Trane Co. case" the employer communicated to
its employees that it had voluntarily established a wage and benefit
policy and stated that such would be continued, union or no union,
and thus, he pointed out, the union offers nothing more than the
opportunity to pay dues for benefits the employees would receive any-
way. The employer also remarked that it would at least equalize area
rates and asked the employees to judge the future by the past. The
Board held that
[s]uch an attitude is not only inconsistent with good faith
89 Southern Car & Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 144, 32 L.R.R.M. 1418 (1953).
90 R. I). Cole Mfg. Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 1455, 49 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1961) ; Aeronca
Mfg. Corp., 118 N.L.R.B. 461, 40 L.R.R.M. 1196 (1957) ; National Container Corp., 103
N.L.R.B. 1544, 32 L.R.R.M. 1020 (1953).
91 Columbia LP Record Club, 120 N.L.R.B. 1030, 42 L.R.R.M. 1117 (1958) ; Humko
Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 825, 39 L.R.R.M. 1339 (1957).
92 F. W. Woolworth Co., supra note 63.
93
 Aragon Mills, 135 N.L.R.B. 859, 49 L.R.R.M. 1669 (1962).
94
 Motec Indus., Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 49 L.R.R.M. 1828 (1962). Note that
here the objectionable statement was neutralized by the timely reply of the union.
95 Cleveland Woolens, 140 N,L.R.B. No. 5, 51 L.R.R.M. 1482 (1962).
96
 Duplan Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 51 L.R.R.M. 1485 (1962). See also Somismo,
Inc., 133 N,L.R.B. 1310, 40 L.R.R.M. 1030 (1961).
91 140 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 52 L.R.R.M. 1192 (1963), citing 140 N.L.R.B. No. 36, 51
L.R.R.M. 1600 (1962).
98
 As to this latter point, see Somismo, Inc., supra note 96.
99
 137 N.L.R.B. No. 165, 50 L.R.R.M. 1434 (1962).
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bargaining, it is also reasonably calculated to have a coercive
effect upon employees who, no more than the generality of
mankind, are inclined to engage in futile acts. There is no
more effective way to dissuade employees from voting for a
collective bargaining representative than to tell them that
their votes for such a representative will avail them noth-
ing.10°
Somismo, inc.,"°1 the third case, represents a far more subtle case
in this area. The employer told his assembled employees that there
was "no doubt" in his mind that there would be a strike if the union
came in because of its "terrific" demands. He added that the company
would not be able to cope with the problem but that he was not saying
whether or not the company would go out of business—the employees
would have to use their own judgment.
Cases are just as numerous where the NLRB has found the
employer's statements or actions to be predictions and hence privileged.
For example, in the 1957 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. case,102 in addition
to the showing of a motion picture, discussed infra, the employer
distributed to his employees at the conclusion of the movie, copies of
the November 1956 issue of Redbook magazine and the April 1955
issue of the Kohler of Kohler News. Both contained stories of the
hardship incident to a strike and pictures of strike violence. This the
Regional Director held was protected by section 8(c) and the Board
adopted his finding.
The Board reached the same result in the Zeller Corp. case"
although the campaign propaganda was certainly far more subtle. The
employer distributed to his employees a copy of a letter sent to him
by the Whirlpool Corporation, a customer of the company, which re-
quested information as to the company's union status. However, the
employer enclosed, in addition, his own statement which read, "Obvi-
ously this buyer [Whirlpool Corporation} endeavors to place his orders
with the suppliers in Group 2 (Companies with no union such as our-
selves), and since you or would probably do the same if we were
in his position, you can readily see bow we can retain customers and
secure new business without the presence of a union."'" In a three
to two decision the Board determined that this did not prejudice the
election.
Other cases where the Board held conduct to be predictions rather
than threats cover a wide range of circumstances including a circular
100 Id. at 1436. •
101 Supra note 96.
102 118 N.L.R.B. 364, 40 L.R.R.M. 1191 (1957).
103 Supra note 69.
104 Id. at 767, 37 L.R.R.M. at 1401.
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charging union bribery, 10" a statement that unionization might lead to
loss of employment,'" an indication that if the union won, the com-
pany might have to move its plant, 107 or that work during slack periods
would be discontinued,'"a reproduction of a part of a ballot,'" an
allegation that the union's strict adherence to job assignments may
necessitate plant removal,'" and a statement that the employees are
taking risks with the benefits they now have."'
E. Pay Stubs
A forerunner to the pay stub technique was the Gummed Prods.
Co. case."' Here the Board held that knowingly false statements made
by the union the day before the election exceeded the limits of legiti-
mate campaign conduct. This was followed by the Bata Shoe Co.
case,113 holding that an announcement by the company one week be-
fore the election of an improved vacation plan was calculated to and
did interfere with the election.
These cases set the stage for the Montrose Hanger Co. case."'
Here the election was to be held at noon on pay day. The employer
distributed the pay checks before noon. On the pay stub under
"Miscellaneous Deductions" was written: "Union Dues, $30.00 A Year
(at least) For Dues Alone PLUS Deductions for Fines and Assess-
ments] THIS WILL BE ON YOUR PAY CHECK IF THE UNION
GETS IN." The Regional Director held that the use of the pay check
or stub as a propaganda device is more than argument, information
or persuasion; it is a technique which exploits the fear of personal
loss by manipulation of the documents used in normal pay procedure.
The Board decided, however, that this is not a per se objectional
means, and that there was no vital misrepresentation of facts and hence
no interference.
The Mosier Safe Co. case, decided two years later, presented a
similar situation. Here the checks normally distributed on Friday be-
tween 3:30 and 4:00 were given out before noon on election day. Each
employee found in his pay envelope a smaller envelope containing a
$5 bill with this inscription:
105 F. H. Snow Canning Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 714, 41 L.R.R.M. 1170 (1957). Note
that here the Board held that the employees could evaluate such propaganda.
too Barber Colman Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 24, 38 L.R.R.M. 1184 (1956).
107 Supplee-Biddle-Steltz Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 485, 38 L.R.R.M. 1288 (1956) ; Chicopee
Mfg. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 106, 33 L.R.R.M. 1064 (1953).
los Lockwood-Dutchess Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 1089, 32 L.R.R.M. 1611 (1953).
109 Stratford Furniture Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 721, 39 L.R.R.M. 1080 (1956).
110 Sylvania Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1210, 32 L.R.R.M. 1652 (1953).
tit Guiberson Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 260, 42 L.R.R.M. 1322 (1958).
112 112 N.L.R.B. 1092, 36 L.R.R.M. 1156 (1955).
118 116 N.L.R.B. 1239, 38 L.R.R.M. 1448 (1956).
114 120 N.L.R.B. 88, 41 L.R.R.M. 1432 (1958).
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This $5.00 is yours—Now the CIO wants us to take at least
$5.00 out of your pay envelope each month and send it to
them. To keep the CIO from getting $60.00 a year out of
your money, vote against them in the election today. $60.00
minimum yearly dues is only a starter. There is also initia-
tion fees—and possible assessments, "political contributions,"
fines and other charges. What a difference there is between
CIO big talk—and the true facts.'"
The Board held that neither the use of the pay envelopes for the stated
propaganda purpose nor the acceleration of the pay hour constituted
such an interference with the employees' freedom of choice which
would warrant setting aside the election.
This same device was resorted to in the recently decided Trane
Co. case although a different result was reached. The employer, before
and during voting hours, caused to be passed out by his foreman (it
was the regular pay day) pay checks from which $5 was deducted.
The $5 was separately enclosed in a special envelope which was
stapled to the check. Upon the envelope was printed the following:
THIS ENVELOPE CONTAINS $5.00 OF YOUR MONEY
This is the estimate amount the union would want you
to take out of your pay check every month, and hand over
TO THEM I
The money in this envelope does not include fines,
assessments and other charges that you may be forced to pay
to the union . .
The Board found that this statement was false in two respects,
i.e., the dues would be $4 a month and under the Tennessee "Right to
Work Law" no employee could be required to join a union or pay
dues in order to retain his employment, even if the petitioner were
selected as bargaining representative. It was further determined that
the employees were not able to evaluate this propaganda, particularly
in view of its timing and manner. The Board stated: -
We hold that, regardless of whether the misstatements were
willful or inadvertent, their inclusion in propaganda material
distributed to employees by supervisors immediately before
the election seriously impeded a determination of the em-
ployees' choice of a collective bargaining representative."'
The Board cited but did not distinguish the Montrose Hanger
and Mosier Safe cases. The dissents of Board members Rodgers and
115
 129 N.L.R.B. 747, 749, 47 L.R.R.M. 1058, 1059 (1960).
He Supra note 99, at 1435.
117 Id. at 1436.
504
PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN PROPAGANDA
Leedom assert that there was no material misrepresentation and that
the Gummed Prods. rule was not properly applied. They urged that
the employees were in a position to evaluate in that their employer
had no special knowledge as to the amount of union dues and that
the Tennessee "Right to Work Law" had been publicly discussed
throughout the state for approximately fifteen years.
Thus the Trane Co. case illustrates the fact that the Board affords
these pay stub devices the same careful scrutiny required of other
written campaign statements. Since clear cut distinctions are difficult,
the cases dictate that particular concern be placed on the timing of
the distribution, truth or falsity of the statements, 118 ability of the
employees to evaluate their veracity in view of the authority of the
source and their practical importance to the employees.
F. Motion Pictures
In a relatively new area of propaganda, the Board had occasion
recently in the Cherry Lane Foods casein to comment on a motion
picture shown by an employer. On the eve of the election, the employer
had circulars distributed to his employees followed by a motion picture
entitled, "Women Must Weep" depicting strike activities involving a
union and another employer some five years earlier. The circulars
concerned a letter, purportedly written by a minister's wife, describing
the strike violence, the shooting of an infant child and the like. The
motion picture was based, part in truth and part in fiction, upon this
letter and was professionally written, directed and played by compe-
tent actors. The employer equated these events with a nation-wide
situation. However, the activities portrayed went far beyond the actual
strike situation. The union involved in the prior strike was not the
same as the union seeking certification here. The Board in condemn-
ing this activity stated:
Here the Employer resorted not only to speeches and pam-
phlets, but used the creative efforts of a motion picture com-
pany to paint a fearful picture of what could happen to its
employees if they voted the next day for union representa-
tion. It is well established that the motion picture is a much
more powerful instrument than the printed or spoken word
in arousing emotions and influencing attitudes. 12°
The Board considered the movie a misrepresentation which exceeded
all bounds of permissible campaign propaganda and a direct inter-
ference with the election of the following day.
118 This principle is clearly enunciated in Steel Equip. Co., supra note 97 and ac-
companying text.
11$ Plochman & Harrison Cherry Lane Foods, 140 N.L.R.B. No. 11, 51 L.R.R.M.
1558 (1962).
120 Id. at 1559.
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This view is in direct contrast with the previously considered
Westinghouse case." There the Board, in agreement with the Re-
gional Director, held that the showing of a motion picture and the
distribution of magazines depicting strike violence, mass picketing,
fighting, stone throwing, etc., at the main gate of a branch plant the
previous year were privileged activities within the purview of section
8(c). However, it should be noted that in the Cherry Lane Foods
case, Board members Rodgers and Leedom again joined in dissenting.
Consistent with Westinghouse, they concluded that the movie was not
a misrepresentation itself, nor was its timing an interference with the
voters.
Considering the course of the cases and the subtleties involved
and in view of the resourcefulness of the participants, it would appear
that the "movie" technique has given rise to yet another medium of
campaign propaganda for the Board's future consideration.
G. Racial Prejudice
Another fairly recent device of election propaganda is the use of
racial prejudice.' An early case involved an eight page letter by the
employer sent to his employees which stated that the petitioning union
was pro-integration and among other things, had contributed $75,000
to NAACP. The election took place in Madison, North Carolina. The
Board said of the letter, "We note that there is no misrepresentation,
fraud, violence, or coercion and that the statements here were tem-
perate and factually correct. They therefore afford no basis for set-
ting aside the results of the election. 7" 23
 In another case decided the
same year, it was alleged that the employer's vice-president, Jackie
Robinson, had appealed to racial prejudice to keep the petitioning
union out.' Again the Board sustained the election stating: "While
we do not condone appeals to racial prejudice, nor the conduct of the
Company's vice-presidents in raising the issue, we do not find that the
injection of the issue, or the context in which it was discussed herein,
sufficient ground for invalidation of the results.'"'
With this as a back drop, the Board was called upon to decide
two cases last year and thus had occasion to re-examine this issue.
The Sewell case" presented a situation where the employer, two weeks
before the election, showed his employees a picture of an unidentified
Negro man dancing with an unidentified white woman. Beneath the
12i Westinghouse Elec. Corp., supra note 102 and accompanying text.
122
 For a more complete discussion of this area, see Soren, The National Labor
Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 563 (1962).
123 Sharnay Hosiery Mills, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 750, 751, 42 L.R.R.M. 1036, 1037
(1958).
124 Chock Full O'Nuts, 120 N.L.R.B. 1296, 42 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1958).
125 Id. at 1299, 42 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
120 Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. No. 12, 50 L.R.R.M. 1532 (1962).
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picture was the caption, "The C. I. 0. Strongly Pushes and Endorses
the F. E. P. C." The same day the employer sent the employees a re-
production of the front page of the Jackson (Mississippi) Daily News,
which contained a picture, four columns wide, of a white man dancing
with a Negress. The caption beneath this picture read: "Union Leader
James B. Carey Dances With A Lady Friend—He is president of the
I.U.E., Which Seeks to Unionize Vickers Plant here." 127 Also beneath
this picture was a bold heading: "Race Mixing An Issue As Vickers
Workers Ballot." This, coupled with the employer's letters and his
distribution of "Militant Truth," a magazine dealing with the race
issue, was held to be objectionable conduct. The Board stated: "We
are faced in this case with a claim that by a deliberate, sustained
appeal to racial prejudice the Employer created conditions which made
impossible a reasoned choice of a bargaining representative and there-
fore that the election should be set aside." This was not, as the Board
was careful to point out, a case involving threats or promises with
racial overtones. 128 Nor did this resolve the issue for the second elec-
tion was also set aside on substantially the same grounds.12° "We find
that the documents in question were intended to and did inflame the
racial feelings and other prejudices of the voters on matters unrelated
to election issues," stated the Board.
The second case, Allen-Morrison Sign Co.,"° involved a five and
a half page, single spaced letter from the employer to his workers
dealing primarily with matters indisputably germane to the election,
particularly the union's stated position on race matters. This was
followed two days before the election with a letter which contained a
one column reprint from an issue of "Militant Truth," the same mag-
azine referred to in the Sewell Mfg. case. The Board restated its test
as laid down in the Sewell case:
So long, therefore, as a party limits itself to truthfully
setting forth another party's position on matters of racial
interest and does not deliberately seek to overstress and
exacerbate racial feelings by irrelevant, inflammatory ap-
peals, we shall not set aside an election on this ground. How-
ever, the burden will be on the party making use of a racial
message to establish that it was truthful and germane, and
where there is doubt as to whether the total conduct of such
127 (The lady with whom Mr. Carey was dancing happened to have been the wife
of an official of one of the new African nations and the occasion was a diplomatic party
about five years ago.)
128 Citing Granwood Furniture Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 1465, 47 L.R.R.M. 1237 (1960) ;
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 117, 47 L.R.R.M. 1237 (1957).
129 Sewell Mfg. Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 51 L.R.R.M. 1611 (1962).
120 138 N.L.R.B. No. 11, 50 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1962).
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party is within the described bounds, the doubt will be re-
solved against him."'
Thus, concluding that the employer's letter was temperate in tone and
that the excerpt from "Militant Truth" may have been related to the
choice before the voters, the Board declined to set the election aside.
V. OBJECTIONS TO CONDUCT OF UNIONS
The same guidelines are used by the Board in airing the objections
to the pre-election conduct of unions as was previously discussed with
respect to employers. Here too, it must be stressed that within the
Board's general rules each case is approached by the Board on an
ad hoc basis.
Thus, aware of the fact that parties "in hotly contested repre-
sentation elections, like those in hotly contested political elections,
frequently make allegations during the campaign which would not be
made by a disinterested historian,"'" the Board will not police the
truth or falsity of ordinary campaign representations. Instead, they
will allow the good sense of the employees to determine which are true
and which are false insofar as they may effect the validity of the
election.'" By the same token the Board has conscientiously made
every reasonable effort to accommodate this rule of reason to its policy
of affording employees a free and untrammeled choice in a representa-
tion election. Thus, the Board has stated, "Not only under the man-
date of the National Labor Relations Act but pursuant to American
democratic tradition, this Board should erect and maintain every prac-
tical safeguard to insure that the results of its elections represent the
free will of employees.'" 34
In considering each case on its own merits, the Board has dem-
onstrated its conviction that a proper appraisal of an election requires
that a realistic yardstick be applied. Regard must be given to the
specific exigencies of the case, including the type of employees in-
volved, the size of the election, the intensity of the dispute between
employer and union, or between competing unions, and the entire
environment under which the election took place.'"
As in the case of objections to employer's conduct, the Board
imposes certain limitations upon its refusal to police or censor the
truth or falsity of union campaign propaganda. If the ability of the
employees has been so impaired by the use of forged campaign ma-
terial, misrepresentations, or other campaign trickery that the un-
131 Supra note 126, 50 L.R.R.M. at 1535.
132 Celanese Corp. of America, 121 N.L.R.B. 303, 306, 42 L.R.R.M. 1354 (1958) ;
125 N.L.R.B. 352, 356, 45 L.R.R.M. 1126 (1959).
133 Horders, Inc., 114 N.L.R.B. 751, 37 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1955).
134 Stern Bros., 87 N.L.R.B. 16, 19, 25 L.R.R.M. 1061, 1062 (1949).
135
 New York Shipping Ass'n, 108 N.L.R.B. 555, 34 L.R.R.M. 1026 (1954).
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coerced desires of the employees cannot be determined,'" the Board
will set aside the results of the election.'
An examination of the following factual situations of union con-
duct with which the Board has had to cope is presented in the interest
of shedding light upon the Board's application of its standards.
A. Alleged Misstatements and Misrepresentations
In the entire area of campaign propaganda, no single topic is of
such vital concern to employees as wages, nor has any other single
topic exerted as much controversy before the Board and the courts.
This is aptly demonstrated by the following cases.
Kawneer Co.'"—A union distributed leaflets two days before the
scheduled election referring to a contract which the union had "won"
with another employer and listing "some of the many benefits" the
employees had gained over their old contract. Specifically, it stated
that employees were to receive one-half, two or three weeks of vacation
depending upon service of six months, one year or fifteen years, re-
spectively. Also, janitors, foremen and watchmen were to receive a
flat wage of $1.81 per hour. However, contrary to the leaflet, the
contract actually provided for a one week vacation for employees
working from one to three years, and janitor's wages ranging from
$1.73 to $1.90 per hour rather than a flat rate. The Board set the
election aside because of these material misrepresentations of fact.
Since the misstated contract had been entered into only a few days
before the election, the employees had no independent means of eval-
uating the statements in the leaflet, nor did the employer have suffi-
cient time to inquire into and challenge the misstatements.
Distribution of leaflets to employees on the eve of an election was
also resorted to in the Cleveland Trencher case.'" The union adver-
tised the benefits that it had obtained for the employees of four other
companies. For one company it purportedly obtained benefits com-
parable to the other three and, in addition, a cost of living clause
together with an automatic wage increase of ten to fifteen cents for a
three-year contract period. This, the leaflet announced, provided an
additional eight cents per hour for each employee. However, the eight
cents figure was admittedly erroneous, and certain of the other fringe
benefits described were either inaccurate or misleading. The Board
found that the union had deliberately made a misrepresentation of fact
under circumstances which did not admit of evaluation. Thus, in
voiding the election, the Board reasoned that since the union was in
130 Merck & Co., 104 N.L.R.B, 891, 32 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1953).
137
 Cleveland Trencher Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 600, 47 L.R.R.M. 1371 (1961),
138
 119 N.L.R.B. 1460, 41 L.R.R.M. 1333 (1958).
13D Supra note 137.
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an authoritative position to know the true facts, it had interfered with
the employees' free choice.
Celanese Corp. of America140—The union circulated a letter
which was received by employees on the day before the election. This
letter followed a series of letters written by the employer informing
employees of the benefits under its present policy and urging them to
vote against the union. The union letter stated:
He [the plant manager] says all of the fine fringe benefits
show the company's interest in your concern. This could be
something less than the truth, for the fact is that Celanese
fringes, as well as other plant conditions, were won through
collective bargaining, and in many instances over the initial
opposition of the Company. 141
This was in direct opposition to the employer's statement that some of
its benefits were never contained in union contracts at any of its plants.
Despite this contradiction, the Board refused to set aside the election.
It reasoned that the union statement was no worse than a half truth,
thus harmless in view of the good sense of the voters and their ability
to evaluate the propaganda in the light of their employer's earlier
statements. It pointed out that the fact that the employer's denial of
the union claim preceded the union's assertion was immaterial since
the employer was not entitled to the last word as a matter of right.
The Seventh Circuit refused to enforce,'" holding that the applicable
criteria promulgated by the Board for setting aside an election were
present in that (1) there had been a material misrepresentation of
fact; (2) it came from a party having special knowledge or was in an
authoritative position to know the true facts; and (3) the employer
did not have sufficient opportunity to correct the misrepresentation
before the election.
Cross Co." a—Union handbills were circulated on the day of the
election. They contained such statements that in 1949 the employer
laid off 100 employees and recalled only three; that contrary to the
employer's claims, engineers were being laid off out of seniority; and
that under the company SUB plan, a typical payment to a foreman
was $8.29 as compared to $1,156 collected by one man under the union
severance plan after only eleven years at Cross. Because the union's
reference to the 1949 incident was untrue, the employer countered by
informing the employees before the election that for the past year,
during which the union had been incumbent, there had been 250 lay-
140 Supra note 132.
141 Id. at 304, 42 L.R.R.M. at 1354.
142 Celanese Corp. of America v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1961), vacating 125
N.L.R.B. 352, 45 L.R.R.M. 1126 (1959).
143 123 N.L.R.B. 1503, 44 L.R.R.M. 1153 (1959).
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offs, and 100 had been recalled. As to the comparison made be-
tween the respective SUB plans, the records revealed that the em-
ployer's average payment was $200, and the $1,156 payment referred
to by the union was atypical.
The Board in reviewing these facts, concluded that the informa-
tion regarding the 1949 layoff was not within the union's peculiar
knowledge, and because the employees were capable of evaluating its
truth or falsity, there was no necessity for the employer to answer.
The SUB statement was at worst an exaggeration and not so mislead-
ing as to exceed the bounds of election campaigning. Thus, the Board
reiterated its rule that mere falsity alone does not constitute campaign
trickery which would invalidate an election. It is only when one of
the parties deliberately misstates material facts which are within its
special knowledge and which the employees are unable to properly
evaluate that the Board will set aside an election.'" However, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 145 in reversing the Board's
determination, found that the union's representations were false and
under the circumstances, not within the limits of legitimate campaign
representations.
Gummed Prods. Co. 148—One week before a scheduled election,
the union distributed a handbill containing incorrect hourly rates
allegedly paid by other employers whose employees the union repre-
sented. The company answered this with a letter of its own to the
employees pointing out the discrepancies and quoting the correct rates.
On the day before the election, the union issued a leaflet which ex-
plained that the corrected rates quoted by the company were effective
under an old contract whereas the rates quoted by the union were those
paid under a new contract. There was no new contract! The Board,
in setting aside the election, pointed out that exaggerations, inaccura-
cies, name-calling and falsehoods, while not condoned, may be excused
as legitimate propaganda if they are not so misleading as to prevent
the exercise of a free choice. The ultimate consideration is whether
the challenged propaganda has lowered the standards of campaigning
to a point where it may be said that the uninhibited choice of the
employees cannot be determined in an election. Applying this criteria
to the case at bar, the union's false statements of fact, repeated on the
very eve of the election in the face of a direct contradiction by the
employer, truly exceeded the limits of legitimate campaign propaganda.
R. L. Polk & Co.147—During the pre-election campaign the
employer, campaigning for "No Union," published comparisons with
344
 But see Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. No. 36, 51 L.R.R.M. 1600
(1962).
145 Cross Co. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1958).
348 112 N.L.R.B. 1092, 36 L.R.R.M. 1156 (1955).
147 125 N.L.R.B. 181, 45 L,R.R.M. 1096 (1959).
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its Trenton plant where the employees were represented by the same
union stating that the unionized Trenton plant did not get a wage
increase in 1958. To this, the union shouted "lie" only to have the
employer again deny that a general wage increase had been given
posting facsimiles of the contract and a circular addressed to em-
ployees captioned, "Here is the truth." Just before the election the
union circulated material which was the last of a series of leaflets
distributed by both the employer and union in which it again attacked
the employer's representations and asked the employees, "Has perjury
been committed?"
The Regional Director, relying upon the Board's decision in
Gummed Prods., recommended that the election be set aside on the
ground that the union's misrepresentations of facts peculiarly within
its knowledge tended to confuse those employees who did not have the
factual knowledge necessary to evaluate the propaganda. The Board
reversed the Director and certified the results of the election, holding
that Gummed Prods, was not controlling, The Board pointed out that
there were two assertions in Polk—one by the employer and one by
the union, both with knowledge of the facts, and further noted that
the employer had refuted the union's allegations, albeit before the
last union circular. The Board thus concluded that the employees
could weigh one against the other and appraise the misrepresentations
contained in the union's leaflet. Again the Board 'pointed out that the
employer does not have a right to the last word.
Reiss Associates'"—On the day before the Board election, the
petitioning union distributed leaflets to employees listing wage rates
paid under seven contracts negotiated with other employers in the
area. While the maximum rates quoted were essentially correct, the
base or minimum rates were inaccurate in six of these contracts. The
employer, unfortunately, was unable to check the accuracy of the data
before the election. Concluding that wage information is a matter
vitally important to employees, that the method of presentation was
clearly misleading and that the late timing made any check by the
employer or employees difficult, if not impossible, the Board held that
the misstatements exceeded the bounds of legitimate campaign propa-
ganda. In so holding, the Board "distinguished" this case from
Hordcr's, Inc.'" where the employer in response to the union's repre-
sentations characterized the quoted rates as "phony," and in Otis
Elevator Co.,"° where not only were the employees themselves in a
position to evaluate the literature, but the inaccuracies were apparently
inadvertent and the information substantially correct.
148 115 N.L.R.B. 217, 38 L.R.R.M. 1218 (1956).
149 Supra note 133.
100 114 N.L.R.B. 1490, 37 L.R.R.M. 1198 (1955).
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Walgreen Co. i "—The most recent of this type of case, the peti-
tioning union similarly distributed on the eve of the election a handbill
which, on its face, purported to indicate a composite wage increase
and vacation benefits obtained for all its members. The union already
represented employees in one unit and was seeking certification in still
another. The members referred to in the handbill included not only
the represented unit, but also employees at plants of an association
representing other employers in the industry. Actually, the Board
found that the increase only encompassed inside employees of the
represented unit, that certain other employees received no wage in-
crease, that none of the union members received increased vacation
benefits, and that members of the association only received a smaller
increase and a three-week vacation after ten years service. Because
of the timing the Board determined that the employer could not check
the information and reply, nor could the employees properly evaluate
the information before the election. Accordingly, with Board member
Brown dissenting, the election was set aside.
General Elec. Co. 152—On the very day of the election, the peti-
tioning union distributed two circulars among the employees; one
stating that employees earned $3.50 to $4 an hour at another of the
employer's plants. This was a climax to six months and some fifty
circulars of campaign propaganda, one of which had claimed that the
average hourly plant earnings were only $3.21 with many piece workers
making $4 per hour. The circulars also dealt with wages at the
employer's other plants where the employees were represented by the
union. During this same period, the employer in his own right dis-
tributed fifteen to twenty pamphlets, some of which sought to explain
these pay differentials. Yet, even assuming the wage data was false, the
Board felt that the information was not within the special knowledge .
of the union but rather within that of the employer, who had an
opportunity to counter the union's statements. Moreover, the em-
ployees should be able to evaluate information relating to wages of
fellow employees working only sixty miles away.
Wheeler Mfg. Co. 153—The Board held that in a pre-election cir-
cular directed to employees inaccurate wage rate assertions regarding
other companies did not warrant setting aside an election, even assum-
ing that the comparison of wages was deliberately inaccurate in part.
It was emphasized that the employees, given an opportunity to exam-
ine the contracts of the other employers, had gained independent
knowledge which would enable them to properly evaluate the data set
forth in the circular. The principles laid down by the Board in Merck
151
 140 N.L.R.B. No. 121, 52 L.R.R.M. 1193 (1963).
152
 119 N.L.R.B. 944, 41 L.R.R.M. 1206 (1957).
153 Wheelerweld Div., C. H. Wheeler Mfg: Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 698, 40 L.R.R.M. 1241
(1957).
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& Co.'" were held to be controlling. In that case there were three
unions on the ballot, including the EOM (Employees Organization
Inc. of Merck & Company) which filed objections to another union's
pamphlet which stated, inter alia, that the EOM "top dogs" liked their
petty graft, that the dues receipts kept the EOM boys on the job sell-
ing out the workers, that of the $1,800 or so taken in monthly the
EOM grafters take it all, that over $100,000 has been paid out to the
willing stooges and that another form of graft which the EOM boys
look forward to is the supervisory appointments which are obtained
by EOM "misleaders" with regularity.
EOM excepted to the Regional Director's conclusion that the
objections were without merit regardless of the truth or falsehood of
the statements. The Board commented that EOM apparently took
the position that if the statements were false, they were necessarily
coercive, and, therefore, the Board must determine their truth or
falsity. The Board did not agree, stating that absent threats or other
elements of intimidation, it will not undertake to censor or police union
campaigns or consider the truth or falsity of official union utterances
unless the ability of the employees to evaluate such utterances has
been so impaired by the use of forged campaign material or other
campaign trickery that the uncoerced desires of the employees cannot
be determined in an election. Acordingly, the Board held in Wheeler
that the statements complained of were obviously propaganda, clearly
recognizable as such by the employees who, in the opinion of the
Board, were entirely competent to evaluate such material.
Calidyne Co.1"—On the day before the election, the petitioning
union distributed a flyer to employees in which it purported to com-
pare wage rates of the employer with those of a company already
organized by the union. The flyer misrepresented the rates for sheet
metal work paid by the organized company in two respects. It gave
a single rate for each job which rate was the maximum, whereas, the
contract actually provided for a minimum rate as well, and that the
maximum rate reported was not then in effect. The Board pointed out
that the union had deliberately misstated material facts which were
peculiarly within its knowledge and that the employer could not learn
the true facts in time to refute them nor would the employees have
time to verify them. In view of the importance to employees of wage
rates as an argument for or against unionization, the election was not
held under circumstances calculated to reflect the free choice of em-
ployees. Thus the Board set it aside.
V ellumoid Co. 150—Six to eight hours before the election, the
154
 Merck & Co., supra note 136.
155
 Thomas Gouzoule d/b/a/ The Calidyne Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1026, 39 L.R.R.M.
1364 (1957).
158
 118 N.L.R.B. 1431, 40 L.R.R.M. 1397 (1957).
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petitioning union circulated a leaflet which concerned the wage rates
which the employer had stated were as good as or better than those
paid for comparable work in shops in the area, and in which it asserted
that another company paid 30 and 40 cents an hour more than the
employer for work on the same type of presses. In fact the presses
were quite different. The employer, who manufactured gaskets, used
the presses for cutting or punching, while the other company, which
manufactured envelopes, used the presses for printing. However, the
Board did not set aside the election for it found that the employees
were aware of the type of work being performed at both plants because
of their proximity to each other, that unlike the rates used by the union
in Reiss, Calidyne and Gummed Prods., the quotations here did not
refer to particular job descriptions, and that the petitioning union did
not have the "peculiar" knowledge of the rates at the other plant since
it was not the bargaining agent for those plants. In holding that the
employees were in a position to evaluate the propaganda, the Board
pointed out that the employees were in fact invited to check the data
because of the statement in the same circular, "Don't believe us; ask
your friends who work there" (the plant used for comparison).
Pinkerton's Nat'l Detective Agencyl"—The Regional Director
forwarded ballots to employees pursuant to a mail ballot election, 158
on the same day that the union made false and exaggerated state-
ments relating to the employer's profits and their distribution in the
form of bonuses to its supervisory personnel. The Board held that the
misrepresentations were apparent on their face, and, as such, the
employees would reasonably regard them as mere propaganda. Further,
the union's assertion that if it won the election the bonus system would
be eliminated and the profits distributed to employees in the form of
higher wages, was also found to be the type of propaganda which would
not interfere with an election.'
Hook Drugs, inc.160
—The union compared the rates of the
employer with those in plants organized by the union. In its leaflets
the union ascribed the rate of $1.68 an hour to a clerk with twenty-
four months service, rather than the correct rate of $1.69 for thirty
757
 124 N.L.R.B. 1076, 44 L.R.R.M. 1596 (1959).
158
 In a situation such as this where the employee detectives are in a wide area at
varied locations, it is within the broad discretionary powers of the Regional Director to
conduct a mail ballot election. This is accomplished by means of a special envelope on
which there is a detachable name tab. The employee receives the ballot and envelope in
the mail, votes at home, placing his ballot in the sealed envelope and his name on the
tab. When the Regional Office receives the sealed envelope in the mail, the name is
checked on the eligibility list in the presence of observers for all parties. Then the name
tab is ripped off and destroyed, and the envelope is mixed with others to be later opened
at one time by the Board agent with full secrecy.
169 Orleans Mfg. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 630, 42 L.R.R.M. 1016 (1958) ; Kennametal,
Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 1236, 41 L.R.R.M. 1267 (1958) ; Kendall Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1401, 38
L.R.R.M. 1078 (1956).
199 119 NL.R.B. 1502, 41 L.R.R.M. 1351 (1958).
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months service. The Board refused to set the election aside, pointing
out that the misstatements were not deliberate and that the employees
had access to the wage rate information. Before the Board would void
the election, it required that knowledge of the true facts must not be
readily available to the employees and the misrepresentation must be
deliberate.'"
Hollywood Ceramics Co. 162—The union distributed handbills
which contained substantial misrepresentations as to comparative
wages paid by the employer. The particular plants used in the com-
parison were not disclosed in the handbill and as it turned out were
not truly comparable as to the type of operations and degree of skill
required for all the jobs involved. In addition, the employer's rates
were grossly understated by the failure of the union to include the
incentive increment in the table of wages and the handbills were re-
leased at a time which prevented the employer from replying.
The Board did not agree with the Regional Director's finding that
the propaganda could be evaluated by the employees and thus set aside
the election. In this area the Board felt that it must balance the right
of the employees to an untrammeled choice and the right of the parties
to wage a free and vigorous campaign with all the normal legitimate
tools of electioneering. In striking such a balance the Board utilized
its rule or formula, as previously set forth in this article.'" However,
it also stated that even where misrepresentations were substantial, it
may still refuse to set aside an election if it finds, upon consideration
of all the circumstances, that the statement would not be likely to
have had a real impact upon the election. For example, the misrep-
resentation may have related to an unimportant matter or it may be
so extreme as to put the employees on notice of its lack of truth so
that they could not have reasonably relied upon the assertion. More-
over, the Board may find that the employees possessed independent
knowledge with which to evaluate the statements.
B. Other Forms of Inaccuracies or Misstatements
Baltimore Luggage Co. 164—Objections to the election, as well as
unfair labor practice charges under section 8(a) (1), were filed and
consolidated for hearing. A settlement agreement was executed wherein
the employer, while not admitting that it had violated the act, agreed
to post a remedial notice in the unfair labor practice case and to have
the election set aside. The union, through circulars, notified the em-
ployees that the employer had agreed to a settlement under which it
161
 Cf. Hollywood Ceramics Co., supra note 144 and text acompanying note 26
supra.
162 ibid .
163 Supra note 26.
164
 123 N.L.R.B. 1289, 44 L.R.R.M. 1119 (1959).
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would not interfere with employee rights. In later circulars the union
pointed out that the National Labor Relations Board had set aside
the election, ordered a re-run and ordered the employer to cease and
desist from bombarding the employees with threats. The employer
replied refuting these statements; this being followed by charges and
counter charges. In reviewing the re-run election, the Board concluded
that the employees were in a position to evaluate the pros and cons of
the matter, and thus stated:
[A]ssuming that the Petitioner's propaganda did contain
some misstatements and exaggerations, we nevertheless agree
that it does not warrant setting aside the election. The asser-
tions did not involve matters peculiarly within the knowledge
of the Petitioner. . . . [T]he employees themselves could
evaluate the validity of the propaganda in its entirety . .
[and] the Employer . had an opportunity to, and did,
answer the major portion of the Petitioner's propaganda."'
Dura Fitting Co. 166—Prior to an election requested by a group
of employees seeking to decertify the incumbent union, the union
distributed two leaflets reciting what purported to be a letter from an
employee claiming that her "arm was twisted" by a forelady who tried
to force her to sign a decertification petition. While the employer did
not have time for rebuttal, the Board again held that the truth or
falsity of the assertion was not peculiarly within the knowledge of the
union and could be reasonably understood by employees to be cam-
paign propaganda rather than an assertion of fact. This type of prop-
aganda will not be policed by the Board. Similarly, in Comfort Slipper
Corp.167
 the Board did not consider the union's alleged misrepresenta-
tion of the number of pledge cards it had received and of the size of
the employer's profits as constituting grounds for setting aside an
election.
Kennametal, Inc. 1 "—The petitioning union stated in its publica-
tion, "Spotlight," that the contract between the employer and the
intervening union had been held illegal by the Board. However, the
Board had only determined that the contract did not constitute a bar
165 Id. at 1289-90, 44 L.R.R.M. 1119, 1120. See R. H. Osbrink Mfg. Co., 114 N.L.R.B.
940, 37 L.R.R.M. 1070 (1955), in which the union misquoted the decision of the court
for propaganda purposes; Machinery Overhaul Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1787, 38 L.R.R.M.
1168 (1956), where the union asserted the program it would obtain if successful in the
election ; Wheelerweld Div., C. H. Wheeler Mfg. Co., supra note 153, where the union
issued misleading statements as to why the employees were discharged ; Vellumoid Co.,
supra note 156, where the union issued ambiguous statements regarding wage rates paid
by the employer and Kennametal, Inc., supra note 159, where the union issued ambiguous
statements regarding the Board's order and wage rate comparisons.
166 123 N.L.R.13. 1665, 44 L.R.R.M. 1192 (1959).
167 122 N.L.R.B. 183, 35 L.R.R.M. 1734 (1955).
168 Supra note 159.
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to a present election and to the contrary had specifically disclaimed
any finding with respect to the general validity of the contract. In
addition, the petitioning union misquoted a management clause in the
current contract between the intervenor and the employer. Applying
the principles enunciated in Merck & Co., the Board held that, in
addition to being false, the statement must involve a deliberate mis-
statement of facts within the knowledge of the utterer and not readily
available to the employees or other parties. It then commented that
certainly the statements with respect to the Board decision, which is
a public document served upon the parties, including the intervenor,
and subject to comment in the local newspaper, cannot be considered
as unavailable material. The misquoting of the management clause
also stood in the same light. The Board noted that in a subsequent
issue of the "Spotlight" this misquote was corrected and thus refused
to set the election aside. 1°
Fry Roofing Co."°—The Board held that the union did not inter-
fere with the election by promising liberal strike benefits if it won.
Even though the union did misrepresent the amount of the benefits,
the Board concluded that the promise of such benefits does not impair
the free choice of employees as would misrepresentation of wage rates.
Olson Rug Co.171—The distribution of literature stating that the
employer would change wages and working conditions if the union lost
the election also does not warrant setting it aside since the employees
could evaluate this propaganda. Nor is the distribution of a circular
objectionable in which the union stated that the employer had lost an
important contract because it was not unionized and implying that
the contract could be obtained if the union won the election. The
Board emphasized that this statement constituted mere opinion or
prediction and concerned a benefit beyond the union's power to confer.
Anchor Mfg. Co.172—The union claimed that higher wages were
authorized by the employer but the manager of the plant had robbed
the employees and would not raise the rates beyond $1.15 per hour.
When the employer refused to bargain with the certified union alleging
that this and other pre-election materials were false, the Board entered
its order, refusing to set the election aside. The employer petitioned
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review and it upheld
the Board stating: 173
Anchor argues that 'where false statements about the Em-
ployer's conduct are made by a Union prior to a representa-
169
 See Milham Prods. Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 1441, 37 L.R.R.M. 1186 (1955).
170 Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 661, 41 L.R.R.M. 1158 (1957).
171
 118 N.L.R.B. 1274, 40 L.R.R.M. 1353 (1957).
in Anchor Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 131 N.L.R.B. 140, 48 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1961), en-
forced, 300 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1962).
173
 Id. at 303.
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tion election, such statements constitute an interference with
the free choice guaranteed to Employees by the Act and the
election should be set aside.', relying on National Labor Re-
lations Board v. Trinity Steel Co. Inc., 214 F.2d 120 (5th
Cir. 1954), in support of this proposition. In so doing, peti-
tioner reveals a basic misconception of the true principle
involved, and of the principle of Trinity Steel . . . . That
principle is not that when false statements are made they
constitute an interference with free choice, but that when
false statements are made which constitute an interference
with free choice, for or against a bargaining representative,
an election should be set aside.
The burden of establishing the requisite unfairness of the election is
upon the objecting party. The court went on to state that "the basic
issue is whether such false statements as may have been made in fact
constituted an interference with a free choice of bargaining repre-
sentatives; it is obvious that every false statement does not." 17 ' It
is interesting to contrast this rationale of the Fifth Circuit with that
of the Seventh in Allis-Chalmers and the First in Trancoa.'
In Allis-Chalmers Co.,'" on the day before the election, the
employer called to the attention of its employees the substantial ben-
174 Ibid. Despite the Board's broad discretion and expertise in this area (see NLRB
v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 226 (1940), in which the Supreme Court pointed
out that "control of the election proceeding and the determination of the steps necessary
to conduct that election fairly were matters which Congress entrusted to the Board
alone") some courts of appeals have disagreed with the Board's findings, particularly
with respect to the issue of truth or falsity. See, e.g., NLRI3 v. Trancoa Chem. Corp.,
303 F.2d 456 (1st Cir. 1962), setting aside, 133 N.L.R.B. 791, 48 L.R.R.M. 1754 (1961);
Houston Chronical Publishing Co., 300 F,2d 273 (5th Cir. 1962), enforcing 130 N.L.R.B.
1237, 47 L.R.R.M. 1487 (1961), and setting aside 130 N.L.R.B. 1234, 47 L.R.R.M. 1477
(1961) ; NLRB v. Tampa Crown Distrib., Inc., 272 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1959), setting
aside, 133 N.L.R.B. 1622, 43 L.R.R.M. 1035 (1958); Allis-Chalmers Co. v. NLRB, 261
F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1958), setting aside, 120 N.L.R.B. 644, 42 L.R.R.M. 1037 (1958).
See also Celanese Corp. of America, supra note 132. In Celanese the Supreme Court
granted certiorari and remanded the case to the circuit court for consideration in light
of Mattison Mach. Works, infra note 182. The court of appeals considered the matter
on remand, distinguished Mattison on the ground that the latter case involved only a
minor irregularity, and again refused to enforce the Board's order. 291 F.2d 224 (7th
Cir. 1961). It took the position that its action was within the scope of its authority
under the doctrine of the Universal Camera Corp. decision. 340 U.S. 474 (1951). There,
the Supreme Court stated, inter alia:
The Board's findings are entitled to respect; but they must nonetheless be set
aside when the record before a Court of Appeals clearly precludes the Board's
decision from being justified by a fair estimate of the worth of the testimony
of witnesses or its informed judgment on matters within its special competence
or both. .. . Whether on the record as a whole there is substantial evidence to
support agency findings is a question which Congress has placed in the keeping
of the Courts of Appeals.
Id. at 490-91.
175 Supra note 174.
175 Ibid.
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efits which it had effectuated for its salaried employees. The following
morning, a few hours before the polls opened, the union distributed a
communication to employees stating that the benefits listed in the
employer's letter were negotiated by the union for the production and
maintenance employee unit and "passed along in restricted form."
The union asserted that had it not been for its negotiations, it was
certain that many of the benefits would not have been granted.
The Board held that mere falsity was not enough to void the elec-
tion. The employees worked in the same building as the production
and maintenance employees, and a number of the salaried employees
had been transferred into this unit from production and maintenance.
During the pre-election campaign the union had raised this same
matter, thus placing it in issue sometime before the election. The
Board pointed out that examination of the cases relied upon by the
employers" revealed that each instance in which the Board had made
an exception to its general rule, not only was the statement false but
the circumstances were such that the knowledge of the true facts was
not readily available to the employees. While not condoning mis-
representation, the Board decided that the employees here had at least
sufficient knowledge to evaluate the propaganda.'"
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circutm did not agree
with the Board, pointing out that one of the nine items of employer
benefits, specifically educational opportunities through a college refund
plan, was not negotiated by the union for production and maintenance
employees and thus was inaccurate. The court stated, "If a truth is
diluted, it is no longer truth. A glass of pure water is no longer pure
if a one-ninth part thereof is contaminated, nor is it 'virtually'
pure."'" The court considered the deviation from the truth to be
substantial and significant, particularly when the election was decided
by a two-vote margin. 18 "
It is of interest to note that in Mattison Mach. Works 182 the
Board's notice of election and ballots inadvertently referred to the
employer as "Mattison Machine Manufacturing Company" rather
than "Mattison Machine Works." The circuit court denied enforce-
ment of the Board's order because it merely assumed that no prejudice
resulted. The Supreme Court reversed and held that the refusal of
177 Reiss Associates, Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 217, 38 L.R.R.M. 1218 (1956) ; Gummed
Prods., supra note 146.
178 See Comfort Slipper Corp., supra note 167; Gong Bell Mfg. Co., 114 N.L.R.B.
342, 36 L.R.R.M. 1581 (1955).
170 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 174.
180 Id. at 616. The court here refers to the fact that the Board, in its brief, stated
that the union's various contracts with the company on behalf of other employees ap-
parently do embrace virtually all nine items listed as benefits in the company's letter.
181 See Trancoa Chem. Corp., supra note 174.
182 365 U.S. 297 (1961), reversing 279 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1960).
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the court of appeals to enforce the Board's order was clearly erroneous.
It was well within the province of the Board to find upon the record
that the occurrence had not affected the fairness of the representation
election, particularly in the absence of any contrary showing by the
employer, upon whom the burden of such proof rested.'"
C. Campaign Trickery
Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc.!'—Three unions were competing in
an election. With union A opposed by unions B and C,' 85 none
received a majority of the vote but B and C were the top choices.
Union A filed objections on the ground that on the eve of the election,
union B circulated a forged letter allegedly written by union A's inter-
national representative. Despite A's protestation that the letter was a
forgery, union B continued to circulate the letter, the contents of which
stated, inter alia, "I've never run into as dumb a bunch of people as
work in this plant . . . [A]s per your idea on who should be sent in
here after the election, I feel you should send in an altogether new
staff man, because we had to go overboard in making promises to
these people and could explain things better." The Board held that
the deception was such that the employees could not recognize it as
a forgery or evaluate it as propaganda, and hence, this conduct lowered
the standards of campaigning to a point where the free choice of a
bargaining representative could not take place.
United Aircraft Corp."°—Here again, union A, competing against
union B, conceived and distributed among the employees a fake tele-
gram, purportedly sent by B to A, apologizing for the conduct of its
representatives for "smearing" union A and praising its rival union.
The Board found that this was a deliberate deception perpetrated by
union A and pointed out that the union's purported self-immolation
and praise of its rival was a more effective vote getting device than
that employed in an anti-union letter as in the Timken case.'" There
the Board set an election aside because the employer, during the pre-
election campaign, had mailed to the employees what deceptively pur-
183
 Concerning the burden of proof resting with objecting party, see, e.g., NLRB
v. Vulcan Furniture Mfg. Corp., 214 F.2d 369, 372 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 873
(1954) ; Orleans Mfg. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 630, 42 L.R.R.M. 1016 (1958).
184 119 N.L.R.B. 824, 41 L.R.R.M. 1188 (1957).
185
 A runoff election is automatically conducted where the ballot in the original
election contained three or more choices and no single choice received a majority of the
votes cast. Only one runoff election can be conducted in a single representation proceed-
ing. However, a runoff, if it is set aside because of objections, may be re-run. The ballot
in this election will provide for a selection between' the two choices receiving the largest
and second largest number of valid votes cast in the original election. 29 C.F.R. 102.70
(Supp. 1962).
180 103 N.L.R.B. 102, 31 L.R.R.M. 1437 (1953). See also International Smelting &
Ref. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 27, 33 L.R.R.M. 1048 (1953) ; Calcor Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. 539, 32
L.R.R.M. 1498 (1953).
187 Timken-Detroit Axle Co,, 98 N.L.R.B. 790, 29 L.R.R.M. 1401 (1952).
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ported to be a spontaneous anti-union appeal from a fellow employee.
In United Aircraft the Board held that union A, by its deliberate de-
ception as to the source of the "telegram," so blinded the employees
to the significance of its contents that they could neither recognize it
as a fake nor evaluate it as propaganda. 188
Heintz Div., Kelsey-Hayes Co. 189—On the day before the election
the intervening union, an independent, selected eight non-employee
male spectators at a ball game, five of whom were Negroes, to dis-
tribute handbills to employees at the plant gate. The legend read
"VOTE UAW-CIO-JULY 14." There was no identification on the
handbill, nor did the distributors wear identification or in any way
indicate that they were employed by the intervening union. The inter-
venor won the election, and objections were filed by the UAW. The
Board set aside the election, stating that while it will not ordinarily
police the method of campaigning, it will not hesitate to do so in cases
of fraud or trickery. The Board asserted its belief that the anonymous
intrusion of the intervenor in the petitioner's campaign interfered
with the ability of the employees to properly evaluate the propaganda
appeal. In order to insure that its elections are conducted under proper
laboratory conditions, the Board held that the failure of parties in
Board elections to identify themselves as sponsors of campaign prop-
aganda initiated by them constitutes grounds for setting aside the
election. This view comports with the standards laid down by Con-
gress in national elections'" which prohibit the distribution and pub-
lication of campaign propaganda without indicating the names of the
individuals or groups responsible for its issuance."'
D. Reproduction of Sample Ballots
In the Allied Elec. Prods. case the Board stated that
. . it will not permit the reproduction of any document
purporting to be a copy of the Board's official ballot, other
than the one completely unaltered in form and content and
clearly marked sample on its face, and . . . will set aside the
results of any election in which the successful party has
violated this rule.'"
Thus, in Hughes Tool Co.,' the intervening union distributed a
handbill which contained a facsimile of an official Board ballot,
identified as a "sample" but marked with an "X" in the intervenor's
188
 See Electric Auto-Lite Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 788, 33 L.R.R.M. 1366 (1956).
189 126 N.L.R.I3. 151, 45 L.R.R.M. 1290 (1960).
190
 64 Stat. 475 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 612 (1958).
191 See also Chillicothe Paper Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1263, 41 L.R.R.M. 1273 (1958) ;
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 50 L.R.R.M. 1355 (1962).
192 109 N.L.R.B. 1270, 1272, 34 L.R.R.M. 1538, 1539 (1954).
193
 119 N.L.R.B. 739, 41 L.R.R.M. 1169 (1957).
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box. The Board set the election aside under the Allied rule and pointed
out that the fact that the handbill also contained written and pictorial
propaganda favoring the intervenor did not excuse the use and altera-
tion of the ballot.
On the other hand, in the Bordo Prods. Co.,'" Kennametal,
Inc.,'" Cupples-Hesse Corp.'" and McDonough Co.'" cases, the
Board did not find conduct in this related area to be objectionable. In
Bordo a union leaflet included a purported reproduction of the official
ballot clearly marked "sample" but altered in certain immaterial
respects. (The name of the employer was given as "Inc." instead of
"Company" and the employer's address was omitted.) The election
was upheld since the ballot did not tend to mislead voters or suggest
that the Board endorsed a particular choice.
In Kennametal it was held that the union did not interfere with
an election by reproducing a copy of the Board's official ballot in a
union publication which contained propaganda on the same page. The
ballot was unaltered and clearly marked "sample" as required by the
Allied rule. Nor did the Board feel that because the campaign
propaganda appeared on the same page as the sample ballot it created
the impression of governmental support for the petitioning union.
In Cupples-Hesse Corp. the petitioning union's leaflet, aside from
pro-union propaganda, merely contained three squares similar to that
on the ballot with an "X" in the petitioner's box. The Board held that
this was neither a reproduction nor an attempt to reproduce the
official ballot. The same type of ballot was utilized in McDonough Co.
However, it was not designated as a Board ballot but was captioned,
"This is the way to vote." It contained the same three choices with the
"X" marked below the petitioning union's name. The board held that
this facsimile was not sufficiently similar to the Board's ballot to
convey the impression to the voters that the Board had endorsed the
petitioner.'"
E. Inducements—Waiver of Initiation Fees
Lobue Bros. 14D—The petitioning union offered employees free
membership in the union specifically conditioned upon its success in
194 119 N.L.R.B. 79, 41 L.R.R.M. 1045 (1957).
195 Supra note 159.
196 119 N.L.R.B. 1288, 41 L.R.R.M. 1272 (1958).
197 118 N.L.R.B. 1511, 40 L.R.R.M. 1409 (1957).
198 For other cases involving "sample ballots" see, Glidden Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 752, 42
L.R.R.M. 1428 (1958) ; Custom Moulders of Puerto-Rico & Shaw Harrison Corp., 121
N.L.R.B. 1007, 42 L.R.R.M, 1505 (1958) ; Paula Shoe Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 673, 42 L.R.R.M.
1419 (1958) ; Pyramid Mouldings, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 788, 42 L.R.R.M. 1437 (1958) ;
Anderson Air Activities, 106 N.L.R.B. 543, 32 L.R.R.M. 1486 (1953) ; AM-0-Khrome
Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 893, 27 L.R.R.M. 1182 (1950).
199 109 N.L.R.B. 1182, 34 L.R.R.M. 1528 (1954).
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the election and certification. The Board set aside the election in
accordance with the principle enunciated in the Gruen Watch Co.
case,' that a pre-election offer of reduced initiation fees is objection-
able when the promised benefit is "contingent" upon how the employees
vote in the election or upon the results of the election.
On the other hand, in the General Elec. case' the Board held
similar conduct unobjectionable. During a question and answer
program on the day before the election, in response to a rumor that
the initiation fee would be $30, a union representative stated that if
the union won the election "not a single person who votes for the IUE
in this election will be required to pay an initiation fee for membership
in the TUE." He also made it clear that the fee would not be set by the
national IUE, but rather locally, and that it would not be $30! The
Board felt that the statement was made in rebuttal to the rumored
$30 fee and was merely a publication of the union's policy of waiving
initiation fees for all potential members during the election campaign
and thus refused to set aside the results of the election. Equally im-
portant, the Board noted that the union had informed the employees
that no one, according to the laws of Virginia, is required to join a
labor organization, and, therefore, initiation fees are not required of all
employees."'
In the A.R.F. Prods. case"' employees were told that initiation
fees were $5 before the election but would be $35 after the election or
a contract had been signed. The objecting employer contended that
this was a promise of economic benefit or a threat of reprisal depending
upon how the employees voted. The Board disagreed and held that
the offer, as reported, meant that when the employees failed to join
the union prior to the election, they would suffer an economic loss if
the union won and obtained a union shop. Since the remarks of the
union were not contingent upon whether the employees voted for
the union or not, the gist of the remarks was merely a prediction of
what would happen if the union was voted in. In any event, the Board
indicated that it could not perceive how this would affect the em-
ployees' free choice in the election.
Finally, the recent case of Gilmore Indus.'" the Regional Director
recommended that an election be set aside under the Lobue doctrine
because the union had informed the employees that initiation fees
2013
 108 N.L.R.B. 610, 34 L.R.R.M. 1067 (1954).
201
 General Elec. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1035, 42 L.R.R.M. 1116 (1958).
202 See also Plant City Welding & Tank Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 131, 41 L.R.R.M. 1014
(1957) ; Reiss Associates, supra note 148; Calidyne Co., supra note 155; Orleans Mfg.
Co., supra note 159 and Otis Elevator Co., supra note 150.
203
 118 N.L.R.B. 1456, 40 L.R.R.M. 1398 (1957). See also Superior Sleep-Rite
Corp., 117 N.L.R.B. 430, 39 L.R.R.M. 1264 (1957), where the union served free coffee
on election day.
204 140 N.L.R.B. No. 8, 51 L.R.R.M. 1562 (1962).
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would be waived if it won the election. Here also the statement was
made in an atmosphere of a rumored high initiation fee. The Board,
however, reversed the Regional Director, distinguishing Lobue. In a
three to two decision, with members Leedom and Rodgers dissenting, it
held that the union's statement did not constitute a promise of benefit
since it applied whether or not the employees voted for union.
F. Other Alleged inducements or Benefits
Ra-Rich Mfg. Co.205—The Board considered the serving of free
refreshments by the union at a pre-election meeting a legitimate pre-
election campaign activity consistent with its prior holding in Bordo
Prods. Co.20e There an offer to employees of a chance to win prizes by
attending union meetings was held not to constitute improper induce-
ment or electioneering. In both cases, the noncontingency was strongly
emphasized by the Board. However, this factor was considered ir-
relevant in Teletype Corp.,207 where an election was set aside because
of the auction or competitive bidding for attendance at the pre-election
meetings of two rival unions. The Board asserted that the progressive
increase in the rates paid for attendance, which at one point reached
eight hours' regular pay for a three-hour meeting of two rival unions,
so lowered the election standards that expression of free choice by the
employees was impossible. This, regardless of whether or not the
payments were contingent upon the employees voting for any particular
union. Contingency was also relegated to minor significance in Fry
Roofing Co.' The Board held that the union did not interfere with an
election by promising liberal strike benefits if the union won despite
the fact that the union did misrepresent the amount of the benefits. It
stated that a promise of liberal strike benefits does not impair the
free choice of employees as would misrepresentation of wage rates.
Charles T. Brandt Co. 209—The Board determined that a union
representative's conduct in transporting employees to the polls and
being present near the polling place during the election does not
warrant setting aside the election. There was no evidence of coercive
statements, and transportation of employees to .the polls was not im-
proper conduct. But in Alliance Ware Co.23° the union's operation
of a sound truck and its broadcast of electioneering material during
the period when the polls were open was found objectionable and the
election was set aside.
2" 120 N.L.R.B. 1444, 42 L.R.R.M. 1182 (1958).
2" Supra note 194.
207 122 N.L.R.B. 1594, 43 L.R.R.M. 1341 (1959).
2" Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., supra note 170.
209 118 N.L.R.B. 956, 40 L.R.R.M. 1248 (1957).
210 92 N.L.R.B. 55, 27 L.R.R.M. 1040 (1950).
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G. Alleged Threats, Warnings and an Atmosphere of Fear
Tampa Crown Distrib.2 "—In an election involving eight eligible
voters, four voted for the union, three against and one ballot was
unmarked. However, prior to the election two of the employees had
received anonymous telephone calls threatening their children if they
did not vote for the union. The Board held that it would not set aside
an election in the absence of evidence showing threatening or coercive
conduct attributable to one of the participating parties. 212 Yet it did
state that it would do so if the character of the conduct is so aggravated
as to create a general atmosphere of fear and reprisal rendering a free
expression of choice impossible.213
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not agree with
the Board and held that there was an inference from the union's
failure to make a denial that it was responsible for making the calls.
In addition, a more conclusive result, according to the court, was
attained by applying the "atmosphere of fear" test since the fear
generated in the minds of two out of eight employees made it im-
probable, if not impossible, that the result of the election represented
the employees' free choice. This was therefore sufficient to set
the election aside.'"
General Shoe Corp.2 "—Before the election, an employee received
a letter erroneously informing her that she was ineligible to vote. The
source of the letter could not be established, thus no interference was
determined by the Board. Also the employer contended that the
employees had been warned, during visits by a union representative to
their homes, not to vote if they intended to vote against the union. The
evidence actually revealed that the union representative told an
employee he would drive her to the polls, but that if she intended to
vote against the union, she need not bother to come. Another employee
was told that if she didn't vote for the union, she should not vote at
all; and a third employee was also asked not to vote under similar
circumstances. The Board held that these statements contained no
threat or warning and would not warrant setting aside the election.
Orleans Mfg. Co 210--Statements made by rank and file em-
211 118 N.L.R.B. 1420, 40 L.R.R.M. 1389 (1957).
212 See J. Spevak & Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 954, 35 L.R.R.M. 1170 (1954) ; White's
Uvalde Mines, 110 N.L.R.B. 278, 34 L.R.R.M. 1640 (1954); Gruen Watch Co., supra
note 200; Marman Bag Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 456, 31 L.R.R.M. 1562 (1953) ; J. J. Newbury
Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 84, 30 L.R.R.M. 1234 (1952).
213 See Pointsett Lumber & Mfg. Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1732, 39 L.R.R.M. 1083 (1955) ;
The Falmouth Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 896, 37 L.R.R.M. 1057 (1955) ; Diamond State Poultry
Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 3, 33 L.R.R.M. 1043 (1953).
214 Enforcement denied, 272 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1959).
215 123 N.L.R.B. 1492, 44 L.R.R.M. 1161 (1959).
216 120 N.L.R.B. 630, 42 L.R.R.M. 1016 (1958). See also Bronze Alloys Co., 120
N.L.R.B. 682, 42 L.R.R.M. 1047 (1958) ; W. A. Ransom Lumber Co., 114 N.L.R.B.
1418, 37 L.R.R.M. 1171 (1955).
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ployees that the workers would be beaten or whipped if they did not
join the union did not warrant invalidation of an election. Such a
result might occur, the Board noted, if it could be shown that the
speakers were so closely associated with the union that they had ap-
parent authority in the eyes of the employees threatened. In addition
an employee, who spearheaded the drive for the union, engaged in a
heated argument with an anti-union employee who tried to persuade
the former to change his position, ending finally in a threat to sue him.
The union adherent told the other to "watch his step" and "not get in
the way." In context, this was not held by the Board to constitute a
threat and the results of the election were certified.
Kennainetal, Inc.217—The petitioning union made reference to
newspaper accounts of violence in a prior strike by the intervenor. The
Board did not consider this interference inasmuch as it referred to a
past strike and not to the present situation, which was completely
devoid of violence. However, Gabriel Co.218 produced a different result
where the conduct objected to involved anonymous and persistent tele-
phone calls of a threatening nature to five officials of union A. The
scope of these calls, all of which were linked to union B adherents,
revealed a systematic plan to inhibit union A's officials from asserting
their leadership in the election campaign. In addition, there were
threats of reprisal directed by union B adherents to union A com-
mitteemen and the tampering with machinery, as well as the reckless
operation of a towmotor in such a manner as to endanger the lives of
union A's officials, and the harrassment of them in the performance
of their duties. There was no evidence, however, that the acts were
committed by agents of union B rather than by its adherents. Never-
theless, this fact was not considered dispositive of the case since the
setting aside of the election was warranted by the creation of an
atmosphere of confusion and fear among the employees.
H. Other Activities
Harsh words or name calling are ordinarily insufficient grounds
for setting an election aside. Accordingly, in Felix Bonure" the union-
made statements, "If the boss is so nice, tell him to take the knife out
of your back," or "the foreman will drop the words: 'If you keep
playing with the union you will lose your jobs,' `Do you think more
of the union than you do of your jobs?' and 'Remember, the boss will
try to short cut the law every time unless you know your rights,' " were
found to be permissible campaign propaganda.
And in Plant City Welding & Tank Co. 22° the Board reiterated
217 Supra note 159.
218 137 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 50 L.R.R.M. 1369 (1962).
219 119 N.L.R.B. 1620, 41 L.R.R.M. 1359 (1958).
229 Supra note 202. See also E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 710,
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that interviews at the homes of employees by union representatives do
not constitute objectionable interference with an election. Although
individual interviews conducted by employers at the homes of em-
ployees immediately before the election have been held to constitute
interference, the Board reasons that there is a substantial difference
between the use of such tactics by employers on one hand and
unions on the other. Unions, unlike the employers, not only have
more need to seek out individual employees to present their views, but,
more significantly, unions lack the relationship with employees which
can interfere with their choice of representatives. Finally, it should be
noted that the union, in conducting its home interviews, did not engage
in coercive or threatening conduct, and thus the objections were over-
ruled.
VI. CONCLUSION
The above sampling of Board cases has been presented in order
to acquaint the reader with some of the issues confronting the Board
in this area. Unfortunately, in highlighting the above factual situations,
all of the details could not be set forth.
The United States Supreme Court has pointed out that the
"control of the election proceeding and the determination of the steps
necessary to conduct that election fairly were matters which Congress
entrusted to the Board alone."22' In discharging this function the Board
evaluates the particular conduct under consideration against the
entire pattern of circumstances attending the election. It is in this
total context that the Board exercises its broad discretion.
In the field, the professional staff under the direction of their
General Counsel, Stuart Rothman, whose office last year handled over
25,000 cases of all types, are acutely aware of the realities under which
these issues arise and extremely sensitive to the impact which the
subtleties and techniques of campaign propaganda have upon the
employees concerned. In Washington the five man Board under the
capable guidance of its Chairman, Frank W. McCulloch, laboriously
examine every facet of each individual situation before rendering
decision, in a conscientious effort to carry out these responsibilities
entrusted to it by Congress. Engrossed as it is in its decisional
functions, both as to matters relating to unfair labor practices and
representation cases, on a day to day, case by case basis, the Board is
properly accorded respect and recognition for its expertise by the
courts which review its findings.
It has been stressed throughout this article that because of
33 L.R.R.M. 1249 (1954) ; Canton, Carp's., Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 513, 46 L.R.R.M. 1049
(1960).
221 See NLRB v. A. J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324 (1946) ; NLRB v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 226 (1940). For the scope of authority of the Court of Appeals, see
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 174.
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factual differences and ever-changing developments, any given case
is of uncertain precedent value. As Board Member Brown pointed
out,222
 while it is possible to classify Board cases in accordance with
predetermined classifications, the cases "must be decided on their
own facts and not according to some formula," and in discussing the
subtleties which abound in the area of pre-election activities, he stated:
It would seem elementary that the institutions of collective
bargaining can be most effectively promoted by bringing the
full force of the law to bear at a time when employees are
most in need of protection—that is prior to the establishment
of a bargaining relationship. Indeed, no relationship may
ensue unless employees are guaranteed the opportunity to
exercise their statutory right freely to select or reject an
exclusive bargaining representative.
It is in this context that the totality of conduct in each individual
case must be viewed.
222
 Address, Recent Trends in N.L.R.B. Decisions, by Board member Gerald A.
Brown, Feb. 1, 1963.
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